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GLOSSARY
Alarm. A warning of an unusual system condition.
Analog. A continually variable representation of physical quantities 
by means of other physical variables, such as current, voltage, 
resistance.
Analog Data. Data that varies continuously over a range of values.
Analog Device. A device that operates with variables represented by 
continuously measured quantities.
Area Tie-Line. A transmission line connecting two control areas.
Baud. A unit of signalling speed equal to the number of code elements 
per second.
Buffer. A device in which data is ten^orarily stored and/or provides 
signal amplification.
Bus. A conductor or group of conductors in an electrical network that 
serves as a common connection for two or more circuits.
Channel. A transmission path between master stations and remote 
stations over which communication signals can be sent.
Circuit. A power carrying connection between buses.
Circuit Breaker. A device used to interrupt current flowing in an 
electrical power network.
Demand. Amount of electrical energy being used during a specified 
period of time.
Digital Device. A device that operates on the basis of discrete 
numerical techniques in which the variables are represented by 
coded pulses or states.
Dispatcher. The title given to personnel in the electric utility 
industry concerned with control of operations and assignments of
load to generating stations and lines.
Disturbance. An abnormal condition within the power network.
Event. A happening in an electrical system of unusual interest.
Load. The amount of electric power delivered or required at any speci­
fied point or points on a system.
Logger. A device which automatically records physical processes and 
events, usually chronologically.
Net Interchange. The algebraic sum of the powers and/or energies on 
the area tie-lines of a control area.
Off-Line. Pertaining to equipment or devices not under direct control
of the central processing unit of a computer system.
On-Line. Pertaining to equipment or devices under the direct control
of the central processing unit of a computer system.
Parameter. A variable that is given a constant value for a specific
purpose or process.
Point. A term used to designate a sensing device that provides the 
source of a power system data variable.
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Program. As a noun, the complete sequence of machine instructions and 
routines to solve a problem.
Real-Time. The performance of a computation during the actual time 
that the related physical process transpires in order that results 
of the computation can be used in guiding the physical process.
Scale. To change a quantity by a factor in order to bring its range 
within prescribed limits.
Scan. The action of acquiring a set of individual point measurements 
from a collection of remote points.
Scheduled Net Interchange. For a control area, the mutually prearranged 
net power and/or energy on the area tie-lines.
Set Point. The position to which a control point setting mechanism is 
adjusted.
Stored Program. A series of instructions in storage to direct the 
step by step operation of a computer.
Substation. A location where transformers, buses, circuit breakers, 
disconnect switches, and related equipment are located.
Telemetering. Transmission of measurements over a long distance, usually 
by electric means.
Tie-Line. A transmission line connecting two or more power systems 
or control areas.





Considerable effort has been expended in the past twenty years in 
applying the hardware and techniques of the rapidly expanding computer 
industry to the problems of the power industry. For purposes of 
briefly showing the development of computer use by utilities, the power 
system has been divided into five areas:
1. System Studies
2. Generation Control, Economic Dispatch, etc.
3. HV Substation Automation, Supervisory, Data 
Acquisition, etc.
4. Distribution Substation Automation, Remote 
Meter Reading, etc.
5. Protection Systems
The first area of application perceived by power system engineers 
was the use of the computational capabilities of digital computers to 
perform the "systems studies" which had previously been carried out on 
analog computer and simulator equipment. So tremendous was the success 
of this approach that once heavily used analog systems are obsolete. 
Virtually every issue of Power Apparatus and Systems (or any other major 
power publication) contains at least one article on digital simulation or 
computation techniques applied to power system analysis. At present, the 
majority of digital systems research in the power area concerns system 
studies. The recent trend is toward real-time studies for system control
in addition to off-line analyses such as fault current and load flow 
calculations. The use of the computer as a tool for on-line monitoring 
and control was recognized early by control engineers. The vast problems 
of control, data acquisition, data handling, status monitoring, alarming, 
etc., which are found in power generation stations, made a very good case 
for the application of digital systems to the generation area. While 
original generation control and economic dispatch systems were analog, 
conversion to digital control is the current trend. More sophisticated 
control is possible taking into account new parameters, such as environ­
mental conditions. In a recent example, boiler fuel is changed from high 
sulphur to low sulphur type based on an environmental evaluation by a 
real-time computer system. [1] Work in these areas has been intensive 
for the past fifteen years and is on-going with new areas of emphasis. 
Because of the emphasis on energy conservation, there are new problems to 
define and solve.
Areas 3, 4 and 5 of the above list have not been pursued to the 
extent of system studies and generation control. This is basically due to 
the requirement that the digital equipment be distributed throughout the 
system. However, since the advent of minicomputers on the technological 
scene, power systems engineers have contemplated their use in control and 
protection at the transmission and distribution substation level. For 
many years, the only digital application has been in the communications 
area. Coded interrogation and encoded data are very secure and efficient 
to transmit, receive, and handle. Most of the communication links termi­
nate in an electromechanical relay interface to integrate them into substa­
tion operations. Only limited work has been done in the use of "smart" 
terminals, digital remote terminal units, computerized data acquisition 
systems, etc.
Limited supervisory systems have become popular with utilities. 
The ability to address a particular substation and receive system data 
or perform limited control Is valuable. Because of this, many companies 
have installed such systems in the past few years. Most of these 
systems are manually Initiated, rather than computer controlled and 
automatically updated. Needless to say, extensive work needs to be 
done to upgrade these systems and incorporate recent technological 
advances in digital systems.
The recent emphasis on fuel conservation has created an interest 
in distribution automation, remote meter reading, load control, etc. 
Remote control of the power system at the distribution and utilization 
level would allow the utility to accomplish control of feeder loading, 
multi-point sectionalizing for service restoration, network reconfigura­
tion, and load shedding. Automatic meter reading and tlme-of-day meter­
ing may also be necessary in the future. The large number of meters 
present on any system makes digital identity coding a necessity. 
Sophisticated digital systems will be required to handle the mass of 
data collection at the residential level.
Protection systems have long been candidates for digital tech­
niques. Until the decade of the sixties, size and cost prohibited 
serious consideration; however, Introduction and development of rela­
tively Inexpensive minicomputers In the past fifteen years has opened up 
new possibilities. Numerous feasibility studies, software and hardware 
developments, and experimental tests have sufficiently demonstrated the 
theoretical capability of a digital computer to protect and monitor a 
typical transmission system at the substation level. These studies have 
shown that the job can be done by a single digital machine, yielding a
system with roughly the same control characteristics as present static 
and electromechanical relays. It has also been confirmed, however, 
that many of the supposed advantages of a digital computer in this 
application cannot be realized due to their cost, the complicated nature 
of the required system, reliability problems, maintenance considerations, 
environmental considerations, etc.
The problem of economics versus speed slowed progress in this 
area and relegated most of the subsequent work to theoretical studies 
and algorithm development. In 1972, however, the introduction of the 
microprocessor (or computer-on-a-chip) by Intel Corporation provided the 
tool which had been lacking to make the theoretical concepts both 
practical and economical. It is proposed here that the microprocessor 
is capable of providing the necessary computational and control power 
to be used not only in generation control and economic dispatch, but also 
in substation automation, supervisory and data acquisition systems, and 
protection systems.
In response to the availability of a control tool such as the 
microcomputer, a new analysis of substation automation is warranted, 
taking advantage of the concept of distributed processing and control.
Many of the techniques currently used to monitor and control substations 
are valid in light of present technology. These, of course, should be 
sought out and utilized where appropriate. However, improvements may be 
achieved by utilizing the microcomputer and distributed control concepts 
to replace many of the existing operating systems. Using microcomputers, 
a power substation automation system has been developed which will not 
only meet all local functional requirements, but which can be integrated 
into a system-wide control structure. In short, the system will interface
with advanced control and data acquisition systems which use centralized 
computers and will make total power system automation a reality.
1.1 Definition of a Substation
A complete understanding of the nature, performance, character­
istics and operating requirements of a power system substation is manda­
tory if we are to attempt digital system control. The word "substation" 
is a very broad term. Between the points of generation and utilization 
of power, there exist many locations of voltage transformation, switching, 
line interconnections, etc. A geographical location where many of these 
functions are performed is known typically as a substation.
Figures 1 and 2 show simplified one-line diagrams of a typical 
power system and power substation. It can readily be seen that each 
substation exists at a node of the electrical system formed by the conver­
gence of numerous power transmission lines of various voltage levels. 
Switches and breakers control these lines. Local manual control always 
exists and with large substations, limited control may be exercised 
automatically or by a central dispatch or control center.
Substations at different levels in the system have different sys­
tem functions. A high-voltage substation may serve primarily to distri­
bute bulk power from a 345-500 kV transmission line to a number of 138 kV 
voltage levels. With the exception of station service, no load would be 
served from these substations. Control at this point is concerned with 
line and equipment protection and network configuration modification.
As substation voltage levels decrease, load service becomes more signi­
ficant. Control at these lower levels, typically referred to as distribu­
tion levels, becomes as concerned with service continuity and quality as 
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increasing, individual substations are becoming more important, making 
automation and data acquisition at this level of great importance.
1.2 Functional Requirements of a Substation
A practical design requires a complete and thorough understand­
ing of the control and monitoring functions a substation might be called 
upon to perform. Typical substation functions may be loosely subdivided 
into four categories. These categories and certain representative func­
tions for each are listed below.
1. Intra-substation and remote supervisory control
a. Breaker open/closed with synchronization 
check
b. Remote opening/closing of motor operated 
switches and disconnects
c. Remote control of tap changing transformers 
and regulators
d. Incremental step switching of capacitor/reactor 
banks
2. Alarming and Status Indications
a. AC/DC station power service
b. Three-phase potential on incoming lines
c. Open/closed/lock-out status of circuit 
breakers
d. Open/close status of motor operated 
switches
e. Transformer winding/coil temperatures
f. SFg gas/oil/air status on power circuit 
breakers
g. Transformer and feeder overcurrent/overload 
conditions
h. Detection of runaway tap changers
i. Status of automatic load shedding equipment
j. Network and bus configuration
k. Substation environmental status and intruder 
detection
3. Data Acquisition, Logging and Sequence of Events
Recording
a. Total station Megawatts, Megavars, and MVA
b. Individual transformer MVA
c. Individual feeder loading and peak determination
d. Pre/post-fault data collection
e. Fault-initiated equipment activity/time 
sequence log
f. Power exchange monitoring for interconnections
4. Protection
a. Primary/backup relaying for line fault clearing 
and isolation
b. Breaker failure protection schemes
c. Equipment and line overload protection
Since substations at various voltage levels in the system have 
different requirements, and since utility control practices are in no 
sense standardized, it is unlikely that any single substation would 
incorporate all of these functions. It should be expected that certain 
capabilities from each of these categories would be found in any 
substation.
Category 1 consists of control functions such as network recon­
figuration and voltage profile modification. Capability exists to 
accomplish control on a local basis, or, in some cases, remotely through 
a supervisory system from a centralized location. Category 2 monitors 
the entire substation and compares data to predetermined limits to 
determine dangerous or out-of-tolerance conditions such as SFg gas
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contamination on a breaker. Trends ultimately resulting in overload or 
dangerous conditions can be determined prior to equipment damage allow­
ing time for corrective action. Knowledge of the open/closed status of 
switches, breakers, disconnects, etc., allows a remote operator to 
verify the configuration of the electrical network. In Category 3, 
permanent copy logging of predetermined parameters such as station MVA 
or fault data is accomplished. Such data is typically used for off-line 
analysis of the system, however, improvement of the logging techniques 
would allow real-time use for this data for superior system security and 
control. Category 4 is concerned with the protection of lines and equip­
ment. Equipment failures or overloads as well as line faults are detect­
ed and corrective action taken. Needless to say, Category 4 is of great 
importance and demands ultimate reliability.
1.3 Traditional Substation Control Techniques
The traditional approach to substation operation can best be 
classified as manual control with analog protection systems. Original­
ly, control (including protection systems) consisted of the opening 
and closing of switches by a station attendant. As power and voltage 
levels increased and coordination and speed became considerations for the 
protection systems, fuses and manual switches were displaced by electro­
mechanical protection. This has existed for many years and, with minor 
modifications, is still the approach taken by most utilities. With this 
system, protection is performed automatically. Voltage and current in­
formation is obtained from the lines through potential and current trans­
formers. This information is presented directly to an electromechanical 
relay which determines out-of-tolerance or faulty conditions and initiates 
trip signals to the appropriate power circuit breakers. The operation
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of one type of electromechanical relay can best be described as a 
single phase induction motor. In the case of this relay, the rotor is 
limited to less than full rotation. As the appropriate V/I character­
istics occur on the lines, the rotor (disc, cup) rotates and a set of 
contacts, physically attached to the rotor, make to initiate the trip 
signal. By altering the winding locations, magnetic structure, winding 
polarities, rotor characteristics, etc., the protection characteristics 
of the electromechanical relay can be altered to fit various protection 
situations. [2]
To overcome some of the limitations of electromechanical relays, 
several manufacturers have developed "solid state" relays to perform the 
protection function. [3] Using solid state components and various 
electronic circuits, such as comparators, integrators, filters, etc., they 
have successfully duplicated the protection characteristics of electro­
mechanical relays. Many problems existed with the first solid state 
relay, hence acceptance has been slow. Many utilities still refuse to use 
these devices. New developments, superior electromagnetic shielding, tran­
sient and surge protection, and the use of integrated circuits is constant­
ly improving these devices and hastening their acceptance by utilities.
Control and monitoring in substations was, and, in some utilities, 
still is performed manually by station attendants. Written records are 
kept of vital substation information and control consists of various 
manual switching operations. While some utilities still use the attended 
substation concept, most have come to recognize that unattended stations 
which are remotely controlled offer superior operating performance.
Because of this, most major utilities have incorporated supervisory control 
and data acquisition systems (SCADA) in their substations. [4]
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SCADA systems had their beginning in 1921 when Commonwealth 
Edison placed distribution substations under limited control using 
telephone lines as a communication medium. [5] Such functions as 
breaker open/close were performed from a central location. From this 
beginning, many utilities developed techniques to provide limited con­
trol over various substations throughout their systems at all voltage 
levels. The first major supervisory system of modern design at the 
distribution substation level was installed by Union Electric Company.[6] 
Built by Control Data Corporation, the system consists of two SC1700 
central processing units which communicate with remote terminal units 
(RTU's) over leased telephone lines. The initial 196 remote terminal 
units will be expanded to 300 stations to provide supervisory control, 
indication, and full data acquisition. CRT's and loggers provide 
operator interface.
This supervisory system's operation follows a rather straight­
forward technique. By entering the appropriate three-number code, the 
supervisor may select a substation and display its one-line diagram. 
Station and alarm data on this substation is updated every six seconds.
A change in status such as a breaker trip is indicated to the operator by 
change of color on the CRT. Alarms are processed by the computer and 
logged out as well as displayed on the CRT. Control is executed by a 
four-step process:
1. Device Selection
A certain device located in the predetermined substation 
may be selected by a four-digit device number.
2. Operation Entry
An operation (open, close, raise, lower, etc.) is 
selected by a key on the operation keyboard.
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3. Verification
The computer checks the proposed device operation 
and determines if it is reasonable and gives a 
valid or invalid indication to the operator.
4. Execute
The operator may either cancel or execute the command.
If it is executed, confirmation of operation is made 
and event is automatically logged.
The RTU's gather substation information and status changes.
Analog information is transmitted after multiplexing and A/D conversion. 
Very limited intelligence exists in the RTÜ and no preprocessing of 
digital data is performed.
Information is obtained from the RTU's at the substation by a 
continuous scanning technique. Substations are addressed sequentially 
and checked for a change in status, and, where appropriate, analog data. 
This information is processed to determine what notification, if any, 
should be made to the operator, and what data should be logged. Tele­
phone lines using a party line system with six substations per line are 
used for communication. Transmission rate is 600 or 1200 baud. Union 
Electric's SCADA system is a step toward total substation automation and 
is in itself a rather complete example of the state of the art of systems 
currently in use by utilities. However, it should be noted that since 
no preprocessing of data or decision making is performed at the substation 
level, the system has less than optimum characteristics.
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) is advancing the state of 
the art by the addition of two substation computers to perform local 
processing of data prior to transmission to a central location. [7] The 
results of their efforts will be interesting; however, since no new 
functions will be performed by their system, total substation automation 
and integrated protection is still unrealized.
CHAPTER II
EVALUATION OF PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT SUBSTATION AUTOMATION
2.1 Problems with Classical Substation Control Techniques
In the case of the data acquisition and monitoring functions, 
the greatest drawback of present systems is the lack of preprocessing of 
data before transmission to a central location. The data is gathered 
and transmitted to a central computer for processing to extract the 
valuable information and to indicate abnormal conditions. Such a system 
is highly inefficient in its use of communication links. A local compu­
ter could gather all substation data, preprocess the valuable data for 
transmission to a central computer, and monitor the substation for 
abnormal conditions, calling the central computer only when such condi­
tions exist.
The greatest problem with the protection system is centered 
around the fact that the protection of each line or piece of equipment is 
essentially independent and fixed with respect to the rest of the protec­
tion system characteristics either automatically or by operator initiation. 
In fact, the protection system relay settings cannot be monitored remotely, 
much less altered to fit changing system requirements. Adaptive relaying 
is quite impossible and the characteristics of the protection system 
represent an "unknown" piece of data to system operators. These represent 
only two of many insufficiencies in present substation control systems.
In addition, present systems will not handle advanced adaptive control,
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since only elementary remote supervisory control, with no local intelli­
gence, is available. Advanced load management based on changing system 
conditions is not being accomplished.
In a recent paper, the computer relaying subcommittee of the 
Power Systems Relaying Committee formulated the following list of func­
tions to be performed by central control computers. [8]
Control and Protection Functions
1) Data collection and manipulation
2) Supervisory control
3) Relay target logging
4) State estimation program
5) Operating procedure recommendations
6) Automatic fault studies and relay settings
7) Power system stability monitoring
8) Corrective actions for stability problems 
Dispatch Functions
1) Automatic generation control
2) Economic dispatch
3) Generation schedule




8) Weather forecast analysis
9) Load forecast— future
10) Evaluation of proposed operations
11) Systems security
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12) Load flow calculations
13) Environmental monitoring
If in the future a central computer is to perform these func­
tions, it will require considerably more data concerning the system than 
it now receives. Specifically, to perform the state estimation function, 
the central computer must be kept informed of all circuit changes and 
substation operations on a real-time basis. Since no computer can 
digest this massive amount of raw data, only changes in the system should 
be presented to central computer. Hence, once again we call for local, 
preprocessing of substation data by a substation computer.
The substation computer working group of the Power Systems 
Relaying Committee has recommended the following functions be performed 
by a substation computer. [9]
Substation Computer Functions




Back-up Fault Detection 






Adaptive Relay Settings (local, remote command)
Adaptive Breaker Control
Breaker Failure (Analysis and Recovery) 
Reclosing Control
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Voltage and Reactive Control
Switching Control in Discrete Steps 




Load Management (Voluntary and Involuntary)
Meter Reading
Oscillography
Pre- Post-Fault Data and Analysis 
Substation Security 
Communications Control












Line Loss and MWH Calculations
Transformer Information
Breaker and Disconnect Status
Relay Status
Tap Settings





Temperature of Other Elements
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Computer Equipment Checks (Diagnostics)
Power Supply Monitor
Control of Operator Interface Display Console 
Real Time Clock
In addition to these functions, the following might also be 
appropriate.
1. With Increasing substation loading, attention will be 
given to automatic load management. Control will be 
at least partially exerted at the substation level by 
"Intelligent" controllers, probably microcomputers.
This will Involve bulk power management and utilization 
level load management (voluntary and Involuntary). In 
the case of the latter, the substation microcomputer 
may use distribution carrier communication systems to 
either control residential/commercial load or inform those 
loads that voluntary conservation measures are immediately 
required. The substation computer will Invariably be 
Interfaced to larger computers for system-wide control.
2. Should Peak Load Pricing become a reality, many utilities 
may adopt automatic meter reading using carrier communica­
tion systems. With such systems, considerable data manage­
ment will be required at the substation level. It is 
conceivable that much of this will be accomplished using 
microcomputers interfaced to higher order computer systems.
3. The future existence of distribution communications 
systems and automatic meter reading opens up numerous 
possibilities for substation microcomputers. For example, 
distribution fault location could be easily achieved.
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A microcomputer system could poll all remote units 
in rapid succession and by performing simple pattern 
recognition on the network using the information 
received, locate a fault or change in the distribution 
circuits very rapidly.
4. With an appropriate communication scheme, a substation 
microcomputer could Intelligently perform such functions 
as remote capacitor bank switching, remote feeder switch­
ing, etc. Such Distribution Automation will become more 
frequent as heavy loading and circuit complexities force 
changes in present procedures.
5. Substation security, including intruder detection, is 
becoming more important as theft, vandalism, and retribu­
tion/revenge attacks on utilities become more frequent. 
Microcomputer based security monitoring and assessment 
systems should become increasingly more common.
6. Many system security and control engineers are looking 
at "real-time system state estimation" as an appropriate 
control technique for the future. Such a scheme would 
require numerous remote units to gather and preprocess 
system data and coordinate communication of that data to 
a central computer, or state estimator. Microcomputers 
seem ideally suited to this function.
It is obvious that the existing supervisory control and data 
acquisition systems, as well as the existing protection systems, are 
incapable of performing the numerous functions mentioned in the 
above list. A new substation automation control system which would
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be capable of performing all of the above functions and which could be 
incorporated into an overall system control structure is needed.
2.2 Evaluation of New Fault Detection Techniques
The limiting factor in a total substation automation is the 
ability to satisfactorily perform the protection function in a fashion 
compatible with system integration and reliability requirements. There­
fore, an analysis of the previously proposed digital protection tech­
niques is appropriate.
The advocates of ultra high-speed breaker action and current 
limiter insertion under fault conditions have caused renewed interest in 
the part of relay and control engineers in various fast fault detection 
techniques. Categorizing these techniques can be quite a problem. Three 





The first category, analog/digital, is easily understood. Pre­
sent electromechanical and static relay systems are analog in nature and 
many research efforts across the country are aimed at incorporating 
modern operational amplifier circuits in developing analog high-speed 
relays. In parallel with these developments, are efforts to analyze 
system Information using digital equipment and make the required decisions 
in software. This work has not progressed to the applications level of 
analog relay hardware and techniques.
The second category, active/passive, distinguishes between systems 
which use available systems state information and those which actively
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Impress additional signals on the transmission lines. Specifically, 
passive systems would be those which use voltage, current, and frequency 
information taken from the line to determine fault occurrence. They 
react to the chan^j in system state and do not impress signals on the 
line. Active systems refer to those which, for example, inject a pulse 
burst on the line and take time measurements for the return to determine 
the distance to the fault. Such systems can be very fast but are also 
many times more expensive than their passive counterparts.
The third category, 60 hertz/high-ftequency, refers to the type 
of data handled by the system. In the case of standard electromechanical 
relays, the fault determination is made from the information carried in 
the 60 hertz signal range, whereas in the "radar" techniques, the informa­
tion is of a high-frequency nature. Certain types of relay techniques 
obviously fall into a specific combination of categories. Electromech­
anical relays are analog-passive-60 hertz, whereas recently proposed 
techniques are digital-active-high frequency. New techniques consisting 
of various combinations of these categories will be pursued at this 
time.
Any practical relay system must either sequentially or simultan­
eously detect the fault, categorize that fault, and take appropriate 
action. This last step might be immediate trip in the case of a very 
high over-current condition on a ground fault or a distance calculation 
for zone discrimination. Obviously before these activities are initiated, 
the system must determine the fault has occurred. Several techniques 
have been recently proposed for fault detection.
The cycle-to-cycle comparison fault detection technique has been 
extensively pursued by Mann and Morrison.[10] The general concept is to
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sample and store the voltage and current waveforms. On a continuous 
basis, the present cycle of information is compared to the past cycle 
of information and any discrepancy indicates an abnormal line condition, 
possibly a fault. Obviously, a one-to-one correlation between samples 
cannot be expected, so tolerance limits must be set establishing an allow­
able difference between the present and past cycles. If this tolerance 
level is exceeded, the sample comparison is labeled. The accumulation 
of a number of negative comparisons over a preset level will indicate the 
abnormal condition. The sensitivity of the system can be adjusted by 
altering this level of allowable negative comparisons. Such a system will 
not indicate a fault for sharp spikes or gradual fluctuations of long time 
constants. A sharp spike will give a single negative comparison whereas 
a gradual fluctuation over several cycles will not be indicated due to the 
allowable difference (tolerance) in sample comparisons. The system can  ̂
be made self-correcting by decrementing the negative comparison indicator 
if a good comparison follows a negative comparison.
Figure 3A shows a healthy waveform. Samples #1, 2, and 3, when 
compared to the previous cycle, will yield positive comparisons and no 
fault is indicated. In Figure 3B, each sample will yield a negative 
comparison and if the fault index has been set at two, the third compari­
son would indicate an abnormal waveform. In Figure 3C, the fifth sample 
would yield a negative comparison. However, the following sample yields 
a good comparison and the index is decremented, cancelling the effect of 
sample number five.
It can easily be seen that adjustment of the comparison indices 
and constants adjust the sensitivity of the technique. It should also 
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sampling rates, discrimination is in a sense inversely proportional.
It becomes virtually impossible to distinguish between a true fault and 
a pseudo-fault if we constrain ourselves to high sampling rates, low 
comparison indices, and fast operation. The technique does give a first 
indication of the type of fault because the faulted phase will usually 
accumulate negative comparisons more rapidly than unfaulted phases. 
However, since no information is gained concerning distance to the fault 
for zone discrimination in distance relaying, additional computation 
can be required. This, coupled with the fact that the method uses 
information contained in the 60 Hz wave, makes the technique too slow 
for ultra-high speed relay applications. It does have promise as a 
simply implemented and easily modified fault indicating technique where 
fast relay speeds are not critical. This technique of initial fault 
indication has been extensively used and is still considered to be one 
of the best techniques for fault detection in the digital-passive-60 
hertz category.
Another passive fault indication technique currently being 
investigated is the transient frequency analysis technique. It has long 
been known that faults create high frequency signals which can be used as 
an indication of the presence of a fault as well as the distance to the 
fault. [11] However, current transformers of standard design perform 
poorly when passing very high frequency signals. This has been a plus 
factor in electromechanical and static relaying because it has served to 
filter out transients, noise, and high frequency signals which were 
unnecessary and harmful to their operation and accuracy. If this 
technique is to be used, work should be done to develop inexpensive and 
practical sensors and noise-immune data links. Work in this area is
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under way by several manufacturers. Including Hughes Research Laboratory 
and Westinghouse. Sensors consist typically of advanced linear couplers, 
air core transformers, shunt devices, etc., with considerable electron­
ics at line potential and with data links of fiber optic material.
A specific application of the frequency detection technique has 












Frequency Detection Technique 
Figure 4
As indicated in Figure 4, each phase of each line is outfitted 
with a line interface unit which detects peak values for voltage and 
current and phase angle and presents this information to the computer. 
While this information is available at all times, it is ignored unless 
an indication is given by the frequency detection interface unit that a 
high frequency transient has occurred on one of the lines. When this 
information is received by the computer, it reads the line information 
and determines the faulted line by comparing current conditions to a 
set of prestored normal values. Once a fault is indicated, a computer 
can calculate distance to the fault or perform other operations using 
the available system information.
The frequency analysis can also be performed using digital tech­
niques. If a computer is used, it is obviously necessary to have fast.
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real-time methods of frequency spectrum analysis. In the past, such 
methods were far too slow and expensive to implement, but advances in 
computer methods for pattern recognition, fast Fourier transforms, 
digital filtering, etc., make a new look at the technique practical.
This work depends on the previously mentioned sensor development and 
field tests resulting in accurate high frequency data. Work must be 
done to correlate this data to various system configurations, the 
effects of series/shunt capacitors, transformer configurations, distance 
to fault, frequency dependent transmission line parameters, etc. While 
the concept holds great promise, it can require sophisticated equipment 
and may prove too sensitive to change in system configuration and too 
expensive for general application. It may well require Walker's dedi­
cated analog fault indicator to rapidly detect the high frequency signal 
and then alert the digital equipment for additional computation. [13]
Another high-frequency technique has been labeled the "C^irp" 
system. While this method uses high-frequency signals, it is "active" 
in that it impresses its signal on the line and analyzes the return 
signal to obtain system information.
As shown in Figure 5, if Signal A is Impressed on the transmis­
sion line, a signal similar to B is ideally returned. The time skew 
(At) is proportional to the distance from the point of signal injection 
to the fault condition. An obvious problem exists with multiple terminal 
feeders where multiple signal returns are received. Also, the nonlinear 
character of the transmission line causes significant deviations from the 
ideal case. Hughes Laboratories has proposed a modification of the 
technique which accounts for these two major questions. [14] Signal 5A 
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to an amplitude plot as shown in Figure 6A and stored. Figure 6B repre­
sents the return from a faulted line. If the two returns are subtracted, 
the result will be a plot of a frequency characteristic which is a 
function of the location of, and distance to, a fault as well as the 
nature or type of fault. While the system will probably work, it is 
highly dependent on system configuration and is subject to noise prob­
lems. It should also be pointed out that transmission line parameters 
have frequency characteristics which are dependent on other parameters, 
such as temperature. A system incorporating this technique will require 
hand fitting to the power system and should prove very expensive to 
implement and later modify.
An additional fault indicating device has been developed by 
Hughes Research Laboratory. [13] It was originally designed as part 
of the controls for the current limiting device they have developed and 
out of necessity is very fast— on the order of 500 ys. The analog 
technique is simply stated, but requires some sophisticated circuitry 
and timing considerations. Briefly stated, the device is initiated by 
a very low level threshhold detector. Upon initiation, the currents from 
all three phases are integrated over a short period of time and compari­
son made to indicate the type of fault condition. This occurs in the 
device labeled "Fault ID Logic" in Figure 7. Once this has taken place, 
subsequent integrations of the line current are compared to integrations 
of a simulated current produced by a waveform generator. This generator 
simulates the waveform characteristics of a line with the type of fault 
indicated by the fault ID logic. If comparisons of these integrations 
shows a negative correlation outside some pre-set tolerances, then a 





















depends only on successive integrations, it can be much faster than 
amplitude comparison techniques. As within the integration method, it 
is not subject to short time constant transients on the system. Its 
response to events such as lightning, switching surges, etc., has not 
been sufficiently determined. It does require broad bandwidth sensors 
and data links and will be moderately expensive to implement. It holds 
great promise as a control for current limiting devices where discrimina­
tion between faults and pseudo-faults is not as critical as in relaying 
applications. The device is analog and additional work is required to 
apply the techniques to a digital system which can be used in remotely 
adaptable control schemes.
V. F. Wilreker of Westinghouse has proposed an advanced fault 
detection/location scheme which uses a computer generated probabilistic 
model of the power system. [16] It is claimed that probability density 
functions can be accurately generated from the system voltage, current, 
and phase data for both faulted and non-faulted lines (See Figure 8).
If a significant difference exists in these density functions, it should 
be possible to create a three-dimensional space which has boundaries 
defining the fault no-fault areas. The advantage of this system is that 
detailed calculations are not required to determine a fault condition.
A certain combination of voltage, current, and phase may indicate a non­
faulted line. If the overall state of V, I, () crosses the fault/no-fault 
boundary as determined by computer monitoring, then a fault is indicated 
on that particular line. If an entire system were monitored in such a 
way, fault detection and isolation could be very fast.
Significant problems exist with the concept as proposed. Wilreker 
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buses and make local decisions. This machine is coupled with a central 
dispatch computer over a communication link. Obviously, this system 
configuration leaves much to be desired in terms of reliability. It is 
seriously questioned whether probability density functions of state 
variables can be determined accurately enough to provide the reliability 
level for fault determination that utilities typically require. A 
system state estimator is also required to accurately determine time 
corresponding values of V, I, <(). Also, the combinations of voltage, 
current, and phase are highly dependent on the particular line being 
protected. This means that hand fitting of the hardware to the charac­
teristics of each line is inevitable. Such a system would require an 
extensive data bank for faulted and unfaulted lines before implementation 
was possible. Another problem exists with fault/pseudo-fault discrimina­
tion. It has not been shown that pseudo-fault conditions do not provide 
V, I, (|) state combinations which could be mistaken for fault conditions. 
It is hoped that such discrimination can be made but extensive field 
data collection will be necessary before conclusions can be drawn.
Recall the protection hardware must detect the fault, discrimi­
nate between true-faults and pseudo-faults, characterize the fault, and 
perform the necessary comparisons and/or calculations to locate the 
fault for proper breaker action and resulted fault isolation. An advan­
tage to electromechanical relays can be seen at this point with respect 
to the previously mentioned computer techniques, in that they perform all 
three of the above functions simultaneously in one piece of hardware. 
While the overall system is slow, it is very efficient in that the same 
parameters which do fault detection perform discrimination and location. 
Certain of the advanced protection concepts perform more than one of
33
these functions, yet several are limited to a piecemeal approach, 
applying different concepts sequentially to perform the entire 
protection function.
Original work was done in this area by G. D. Rockefeller, then 
of Westinghouse, who pursued in depth the use of a digital computer for 
relaying a transmission line. [17] Rockefeller correctly pointed out 
that the problems of computer relaying were basically speed and selectiv­
ity. While he never solved the speed problem, his work on selectivity 
and zone discrimination was significant. This work, coupled with that 
of Mann and Morrison on techniques for impedance calculation, represents 
the basis for digital distance protection techniques. [18]
The basic concept of distance protection requires the determina­
tion of the impedance of the faulted line from voltage and current 
samples. For example, in the technique of Mann and Morrison, the modulus 
of the impedance can be determined from, a )
where Vpk^ = v% + (2)
Ipk^ + i^ + i'
2
0)
and the phase difference can be determined from
(3)
<t>j = arctan - arctan (4)
The values v, v', i, i' are derived from averaging samples and 
using the central difference expression for derivatives. Considerable 
success was shown using this technique. Specifically, for 1000 test 
faults, 99% had i 10% modulus and -7° argument accuracy for the 
impedance.
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Extensions of this work, including improved numerical analysis 
and sampling techniques have been numerous. [19,20,21] However, while 
the selectivity of these techniques is excellent, speed remains a prob­
lem. Their use in backup relaying and fault location should prove to 
be their primary application in the future.
A recently developed technique by John Horton proposes to use 
Walsh functions to somewhat alleviate the speed problem inherent in 
other digital impedance techniques. [22] Walsh functions assume the 
values plus or minus one and therefore all calculations reduce to addi­
tion and subtraction. Since other Impedance calculation algorithms 
require squaring, multiplying, dividing, etc., Walsh functions algorithms 
should result in considerable computational time reduction. In a rather 
detailed treatment, Horton has shown this to be the case while maintain­
ing an equivalent accuracy in calculations. While Horton proposes this 
technique to do both fault detection and distance calculations, it seems 
best suited to the latter when one considers multiple line substations. 
Possible uses for the technique will be pursued in a later section.
2.3 Evaluation of Previous System Designs
A. IBM - Substation Control System
Several substation automation system designs have resulted from 
attempts to automate substation control functions and perform digital 
protective relaying. In 1969, Patrick Mantey proposed a digital substa­
tion control system to perform event recording, digital relaying, and 
substation monitoring. [23] While his overall analysis of substation 
data acquisition requirements was acceptable, his analysis of the protec­
tion system was inadequate, and consequently his time estimates for 
relaying a large substation were inaccurate. In Mantey's system.
35
substation event recording and monitoring would be performed by the 
standard configuration of ADC, multiplexer, parallel/serial converter, 
and modulation-démodulation unit (modem) seen in Figure 9. In addition, 
a single substation computer would be interfaced to the line by dedicat­
ed sampling hardware initiated by a zero crossing detector to provide 
a CPU interrupt for the relay subprogram (Figure 10). While the concept 
makes efficient use of CPU time and requires a minimum of equipment, it 
is totally unacceptable. It has been conclusively shown that the time 
required to detect a fault, sample faulted line data, calculate impedance 
and initiate breaker action (while maintaining acceptable selectivity 
and discrimination) is considerably longer than the 295 psec Mantey 
estimated. The Westinghouse-P.G.&E. relaying project, using a Prodar 70 
computer to relay the Tesla-Bellota 230 kv line, consistently showed 
overall fault detection and zone discrimination times of 20-23 psec.[24] 
Even with more advanced computer equipment, this time could in no way 
be reduced to the expectations of Mantey. (It should be noted that the 
Prodar 70 was consistently faster than conventional relaying).
To help eliminate the burden of fault detection from the CPU, 
Walker proposes the use of a dedicated frequency detector (previously 
discussed) in conjunction with special line interface units. [25] When 
a fault occurs, the high frequency transients are detected by the 
frequency detector which notifies the computer that a fault may exist.
The computer obtains information from the line interface units, processes 
it, verifies the existence of a fault, and initiates the appropriate 
action. This technique considerably reduces the CPU time required to do 
fault detection and discrimination. However, even if the speed of the 


























IBM - COMPUTER RELAYING SYSTEM 
FIGURE 10
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Is not. The loss of protection in a substation means multiple-millions 
of dollars of equipment Is susceptible to destruction. Even 99.5% 
computer availability Is not acceptable In such cases. Most utilities 
have therefore categorically refused the concept of single computer 
protection In substations. The question of reliability (computer avail­
ability) will be treated In a later section.
B. Substation Automation Approach: Hughes Laboratories
An analysis of the substation automation approach proposed by 
Hughes Research Laboratories shows certain unique features, but a rather 
standard system concept. [26] As can be seen from Figure 11, substation 
lines and equipment are monitored by sensors and the data Is communicated 
to the processing equipment through data links. The structure of this 
system is not unique, but the equipment Is. The sensors are broad band­
width In nature, as opposed to the conventional CT, PT, etc. The signal
conditioning and encoding Is done at the sensor In a high-voltage envir­
onment. Distinct advantages are derived from this technique. Substation 
noise Interference with communication links Is minimized because the 
analog Information is encoded and transmission occurs In a coded format. 
The Information Is carried over fiber optics, providing Isolation between 
the high-voltage and low-voltage sections. Using frequency modulation 
or pulse-wldth modulation techniques gives good noise Immunity. This 
sophistication In sensing Is required by the Hughes System since the 
processing equipment they have devised requires broad bandwidth, high- 
frequency data. Once the Information Is processed, the resulting control 
decisions are communicated to the actuators for the on-line devices. A 
logger Is provided to record operations and system data. Status and 







action is taken. A terminal is provided for manual inputs to the 
control equipment.
The brain of the system is the processor-substation controller 
combination. This system must not only monitor and record voltage, cur­
rent, and power data, but it must also accomplish the protective relay 
function and fault data recording for all lines in the substation. The 
memory requirements for such a machine would be excessive. The computer 
system is located at the substation, thus not depending on long communi­
cation links; however, the proposed system is basically a single proces­
sor concept which, from a reliability viewpoint, is not acceptable. Too 
much of the overall control and monitoring of the system has been 
dedicated to the single processor-controller combination.
2.4 Substation Automation; State of the Art
The state of the art of substation automation including system 
protection is, at this point, easily described. It has been shown that 
rather complex systems exist to provide limited remote control and 
monitoring of substations. The most advanced of these systems use sub­
station computers for pre-processing of data prior to transmission to a 
central control computer. While this may seem a rather up-to-date 
approach, one can see by analyzing the functional capability of the 
systems currently in use that they are very limited in scope.
System protection is in practice being performed as always, 
using analog hardware which functions in a parallel, independent fashion 
with respect to the rest of the system. Attempts to implement digital 
relaying have failed, not because of inadequate techniques, but due to 
system hardware configurations resulting in unacceptable reliability. 
State estimation is only crudely performed and system trend analysis is
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quite Insufficient. In short, all existing and proposed systems are 
somewhat lacking in system integration, consisting mainly of independent 
subsystems superimposed on each other in the substation. It has been 
shown that others have approached the problem in various ways, yielding, 
to this point, unsatisfactory results. The overriding problem with most 
of these systems is inferior reliability. Exceptional reliability is a 
necessary condition which must be met by all substation systems. Some 
have improved their reliability using very expensive techniques— an 
equally unacceptable solution. An extension in the state of the art is 
obviously called for and herein has been provided. It directly attacks 
the question of system integration and presents a solution which is both 
reliable and economically acceptable.
CHAPTER III 
SUBSTATION SYSTEM ANALYSIS
3.1 System Requirements and Design Steps
An analysis of the control requirements in the power system 
shows several features: (1) It is necessary that information from all
levels of the system be analyzed at a central data collection point to 
determine appropriate system control strategy. (2) To prevent a central 
collection point from processing excess "non-critical" data, distributed 
preprocessing is required at the substation level. (3) Substations per­
form certain critical control functions and consequently must have 
"stand alone" capability making their critical function independent of 
communication links. (4) Since substations exercise control over numer­
ous lines and pieces of equipment, said control must be distributed in 
such a way as to preserve system reliability.
These requirements obviously specify a highly sophisticated 
hierarchical control system. However, the "weak link" character of 
communication systems dictates that some form of "stand alone" capability 
for the individual substation and its subsystems is mandatory. In order 
to determine an acceptable system design incorporating the above require­
ments, the following steps were taken:
1. Identification of the power system control/monitoring 
functions to be performed.




3. An Identification of subsystems requiring "stand alone" 
capability.
4. An evaluation of the necessary degree of distributed 
computation/control between control center and substations.
5. Evaluation of the information requirements at all levels 
of the system and the necessary degree of Information 
exchange between the system levels.
6. A determination of the critical nature of communication 
links at all levels.
7. Formulation of a hierarchical control system incorporating 
the requirements of steps 1-6.
The necessary and desired control and monitoring functions to be 
performed by the automation system have previously been identified, 
therefore Step 2 can now be pursued. An analysis of the substation 
functions shows that only a limited number could be labeled "priority" 
or "critical" functions on a short-term, emergency basis. For example, 
temporary loss of a communication link between the substation systems 
and a central computer would prevent carrying out some of the functions 
(e.g. system state estimation). On a short-term basis, most of these 
functions can be lost without degrading the operation of the power sys­
tem or causing undue pressure on the overall system control center. 
However, loss of the protection system at the substation level cannot 
be tolerated for any time duration. In short, it is a high priority and 
a critical function. In practice, it is the only substation system 
which must be absolutely maintained at the expense of all else.
Several other functions are important and should be maintained 
if possible during such contingencies as loss of a communication link. 
Pre/post-fault data recording and sequential event recording are very 
important and should not depend on inter-system communication links.
This information is mandatory if an accurate picture of substation opera­
tion during an abnormal period is to be reconstructed.
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Fault location, evaluation of subsystem and equipment operation 
and performance, analysis of power system response to a specific contin­
gency, etc., may all depend on the availability of this data. It is 
desirable that these functions, along with the protection system, be 
maintained during any contingency which would isolate the substation 
from the rest of the power system.
Steps 3 and 4 call for an analysis of the appropriate distribu­
tion of control between the independent and integrated substation auto­
mation systems and a central control computer. When one considers that 
a utility may have several hundred substations, choices seem very limited. 
In the past, virtually all processing of data was done by a central com­
puter (if it existed). This was possible due to the very limited 
number of functions these systems performed and the relatively small 
amount of monitoring and data collection done. With the proposed expan­
sion of the functional capability of the substation systems, it is quite 
impossible to expect a central processor to handle this mass of data in 
an efficient manner with adequate speed. Therefore, an "intelligent" 
substation which combines the functions of data handling and preprocess­
ing to relieve the burden placed on the central computer is the logical 
choice. This also reduces the reliability requirements on the inter­
computer, long-distance communication links which, to date, have 
presented considerable problems.
Consequently, the more preprocessing and decisions which can be 
made at the substation level, the more reliable and efficient will be 
the entire system. This distributed processing concept which concen­
trates much of the activity at the lower level of the computer hierarchy 
is ideally suited to our needs.
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3.2 Proposed Hierarchy for Data Flow and Control Decisions
Flow Chart 1 and Figure 12 schematically depict a distribution 
of data and the declslon-maklng process suggested by previously defined 
system constraints. As Flow-Chart 1 Indicates, the substation control 
system receives system data and performs the limited preprocessing to 
determine If a critical function Is Involved. If so, an Immediate 
decision Is made by the local substation system and appropriate action 
Is taken. If a control center decision Is required, only the appro­
priate data Is passed to the central computer over communication links. 
This Information Is again processed and a decision, based on this data, 
and that from other substations. Is communicated to the subsystem which. 
In turn. Initiates appropriate substation action.
It should be noted that this configuration meets all the re­
quirements set forth previously. No critical substation operation would 
depend on a communication link, thus Improving overall reliability.
Only that Information deemed necessary by the central computer Is trans­
mitted over communication channels, thus easing the burden placed on 
these channels and relieving the central computer of unnecessary proces­
sing.
At all levels, the central computer Is kept Informed of activity 
so that the state of the power system Is readily available to system 
operators. Figure 12 further shows this hierarchy of declslon-maklng.
It Is easily seen that the substation system has stand-alone capability 
to make all critical decisions. While viewing Figure 12, an example of 
system declslon-maklng seems appropriate. Assume a large power auto 
transformer Is over-heating. The oil temperature Increase will be 
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substation control system. At this point, the central computer system 
is notified of the condition and in turn alarms the condition to the 
system operator. Meanwhile, the local control system could take inter­
mediate steps, such as turning on cooling fans, load management action 
to reduce the load on the transformer, or, if matters become critical, 
remove the transformer completely from the system.
Another contingency might be a faulted transmission line. Such 
a situation requires an immediate decision by the local unit. When this 
decision is made, appropriate action by substation equipment is initiated 
and simultaneously the central computer is notified of the condition and 
the subsequent substation activity. The central computer may deem addi­
tional action necessary, and upon receipt of a command from the central 
unit, the substation system can pursue additional measures. Again, 
processing of system data and decision-making on a local basis while 
interacting with the central conq>uter over non-critical communication 
links result in a very reliable and practical system.
3.3 Possible Computational System Designs
Determination of a hardware configuration which is capable of 
meeting the functional requirements of our system in a reliable fashion 
is now appropriate. Referring to the work of Murray and Dromey shows 
that considerable attention has been given to single, double, and triple 
computer configurations to provide computational power in a reliable 
fashion. [27] No single computer system is acceptable, and even complete 
duplex operation or triplex (two out of three) have significant disadvan­
tages— obvious ones being cost and the inability of such systems to 
efficiently handle multiple simultaneous contingencies with an acceptable 
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factor is a duplex parallel configuration operating in a true multi­
processor mode. Machines can be multi-programmed such that each can 
perform any function. Figure 13 compares these systems and shows their 
relative MTBF (mean-time-between-failure). However, while the parallel 
duplex operation does offer a significant improvement over the other 
configurations, it still has serious drawbacks. Again, simultaneous 
contingencies and speed requirements would be serious problems for this 
system. It should be recognized that the system must, on a continuous 
basis, perform many different information processing functions and simul­
taneously protect all equipment and transmission lines associated with 
the substation. Walker has shown this to be an extreme computational 
burden which cannot be performed by a single computer of the type com­
patible by reason of cost and environmental considerations to the 
substation. [28] We are therefore forced to an alternate approach.
3.4 Proposed Subsystem Configuration for Distributed Processing
Analyzing the Decision Process Flow Chart, the previously set 
system functional requirements, and the required reliability standards 
result in the subsystem configuration for distributed processing shown 
in Figure 14.
While the central computer system is not of direct interes t to 
this work, a brief analysis is appropriate. The configuration should be 
a duplex, multiprogrammed system, with dual peripheral equipment and 
interfaces to provide maximum mean time between failure (MTBF) and 
overall reliability. This technique, proposed by Murray and Dromay, 
would reduce by over fifty percent the system failure rate compared to 
that of the simpler single computer with redundant, independent back-up. 
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necessary human Interface and I/O, Including graphic display and command 
capability. The communications link used could be telephone pair, micro­
wave system, or hopefully a more reliable technique yet to be fully 
developed.
The central computer system would be capable of performing all 
the functions previously mentioned in the list in section 2.1. It is 
through this central computer that all substations would be accessed by 
system operators. All substation information is processed by the central 
computer for presentation to the operator in the form of logs, alarms, 
system network diagrams, etc. [30] Decisions affecting the operation 
of the whole power system or involving more than one substation could be 
made at this level and subsequent control activity transferred as appro­
priate to the individual substation.
The next level of control is physically located at the substa­
tion. Substation interface to the central computer is accomplished 
through a substation communications and control unit (SCCU). This 
"command center" coordinates all substation activity and handles all 
extra substation communications. Local control is accomplished by acces­
sing the substation through this unit. Decisions are made at this level 
which involve several substation control points. This system is again 
a duplex, parallel configuration to provide maximum availability. Pre­
processing of all data occurs at this level before transmission to the 
central computer. To provide maximum substation independence and 
critical function reliability, the SCCU has complete "stand alone" 
capability with respect to the central computer. Loss of communication 
link A will in no way degrade the substation control system response to 
a critical contingency, such as a transmission line fault. Hence, no 
critical control function depends on the availability of a long
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distance communication link, as stated in our previous system require­
ments .
Direct control and monitoring of the substation is accomplished 
using subsystems called dedicated control units (DCU) which interface 
directly with substation equipment and all sensors and transducers. It 
is at this level that the bulk of information processing and decision 
making is accomplished. For example, a DCU could be used to scan all 
substation transducers such as those for temperature, pressure, humidity, 
gas analysis, and fluid level. Should an abnormal condition be detected, 
predetermined action for that contingency can be immediately initiated 
while the SCCU is notified of the condition, where it is located, and 
what action has been taken. This information would subsequently be 
transmitted to the central computer and the operator would be notified. 
Maximum speed is achieved using this technique and since the communica­
tion link is not required by the operation, a high degree of critical 
function reliability is achieved. A DCU could also be dedicated to each 
transmission line for fault detection and classification and to indicate 
loading trends. Note that this dedicated hardware duplicates the config­
uration currently used for protection hardware, but provides the system 
integration and remote addressability to the protection equipment which 
is totally missing in present systems.
3.5 Division of Control Functions by Subsystems
A determination of the nature and required number of subsystems 
at the substation is now appropriate. As stated in our previous system 
analysis, each transmission line would receive primary protection from a 
single DCU (dedicated control unit). This DCU would have complete 
"stand alone" capability to assure independence and isolation from
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failures in other substations. Under fault conditions, it would be re­
quired to perform fault protection and classification, breaker trip 
initiation, breaker failure analysis and fault location. Under normal 
conditions, it would perform loading trend analysis, overload alarming, 
and self diagnosis. The secondary relaying DCU is necessary to perform 
back-up protection for the transmission lines. This unit would do multi­
ple line protection by scanning various lines on a regular basis for 
abnormal conditions. Since the unit would only see service in the un­
likely event of primary DCU failure, the degree of degradation of 
protection speed introduced by the scanning technique is deemed acceptable. 
Additional DCU's would be required to perform transformer, bus, and 
equipment protection. The size and number of these units is a function 
of the size of the substation.
A DCU is required to perform system diagnostics and monitor sub­
station security. This unit would detect failure of other subsystems, 
alarm the condition, and initiate corrective action, such as switching 
in a spare DCU. A dedicated control unit would also be required to 
perform data acquisition, sequence of events recording, alarming, and 
"switching" type control. This unit would be interfaced to a logger for 
permanent substation information records and interfaced for control to 
all tap changing transformers, motor operated switches, switched reactors 
and capacitors, etc. A parallel, duplex configuration is recommended 
for this subsystem. Separate DCU's would be provided, if required, for 
environmental monitoring, real time, system state estimation, or other 
desired functions.
The SCCU (Substation Communication Control Unit) subsystem would 
require interfacing to all protection, security, data acquisition, and
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control DCU's. It would have a local teletype and logger capability 
and would preprocess all data going to the central computer and appro­
priately distribute all incoming commands and requests from the communi­
cation links. Again, this unit should have a duplex, parallel hardware 
configuration. The segregation of substation functions into the various 
subsystems previously mentioned follows.
Division of functions by subsystem
1. Data and Control DCU (two per substation)
Data Acquisition
•Fault data collection 








•Remote Breaker Trip 
•Motor Operated Switches 





2. Primary Relaying DCU (one per line)
Single Line Protection 
•Fault Detection 
•Fault Classification 
•Breaker Trip Initiation 
•Breaker Failure Analysis 
•Fault Location
Loading Trend Analysis 
•Overload Alarming
Self Diagnostics





Bus Bar Protection 
etc.
5. Security DCU




HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS
4.1 Subsystems With Peripheral Equipment
The interconnection of the various subsystems with the required 
peripherals is shown in the following diagrams. Figure 15 shows the 
primary relaying configuration. The primary relaying DCU receives 
information from a single three-phase transmission line. This informa­
tion is tapped from the lines through appropriate transducers, signal 
conditioners and analog-to-digital converters. Projecting the availa­
bility of new high voltage transducers currently being developed by 
General Electric and Westinghouse, it is assumed that the above mentioned 
functions would occur at line potential.[31] Transmission of the 
information would occur over multiple channel data links using optical 
waveguide techniques and would be accumulated at ground potential by 
appropriate electronics. From this point, information transmittal 
would be made over a secure data link in a parallel fashion to the 
primary relaying DCU located in the substation control house. For 
certain types of relay schemes, the primary relaying DCU also requires 
information from nearby substations. Specifically, in certain types of 
protection schemes, information from both line terminals is required to 
make an appropriate protection decision. Should such a scheme be chosen, 
a necessary communications link and model is required to inferface the 




























PRIMARY RELAYING DCU 
FIGURE 15
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Is also Interfaced to a breaker control unit for the obvious purpose 
of tripping the appropriate breaker or breakers should fault conditions 
occur. For purposes of alarming conditions and receiving commands, the 
primary DCU is interfaced to the substation communication and control 
unit (SCCU). This unit in turn is connected through appropriate communi­
cations interfacing and modems to the central control computer over a 
long distance communication link. The SCCU has teletype capability 
which can be used to address the primary DCU and alter protection para­
meters . The security DCU is interfaced both with the primary relaying 
DCU and the substation communication and control unit. The security DCU 
runs a regular check on the availability of the primary DCU to perform 
the protection function. Should the primary DCU fail for any reason, 
the security DCU takes appropriate action including alarming the 
condition to the SCCU for relaying to the central computer and subse­
quently to the system operator. It should be noted that the primary 
relaying DCU and its associated peripherals, excluding the SCCU, have 
stand alone capability. This means that should the communications 
interface to the SCCU fail, or the SCCU itself experience failure, line 
protection is not affected.
Figure 16 shows the data and control DCU and its associated 
peripherals and interconnections. This unit is interfaced to the trans­
mission lines and all substation equipment for purposes of obtaining 
system data to be passed to the central operator and/or logged on a 
local logger. Analog sensors are addressed sequentially using a 
scanning technique and a multiplexer and analog-to-digital converter 
prepares the information for presentation to the data and control DCU. 
























DATA AND CONTROL DCU 
FIGURE 16
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directly. The DCU has a logger, probably a cassette type data storage 
device, to store certain types of local information. Other information 
is transmitted through an interface to the SCCU to the central computer 
over the long distance communication link. This data is preprocessed 
before transmittal by both the data DCU and the SCCU. Only that informa­
tion which is of a critical nature or requested by the central computer 
is transmitted to ease the communication burden on the data links.
Should an abnormal condition occur (e.g. transformer overheating), the 
data DCU alarms the condition immediately to the central computer, which 
in turn alarms the system operator. Should appropriate action be 
possible, the data DCU initiates this action through an interface to 
control outputs. For purposes of restructuring a picture of substation 
activity, the data DCU keeps a chronological record of events timed by 
a system clock module. This function is of specific Importance under 
fault conditions when information concerning substation activity may 
help determine the reason for the fault and whether the substation took 
appropriate action. The specific control of such devices as tap chang­
ing transformers, switched reactor banks, motor operated switches, 
switched capacitors, etc. is controlled by this DCU. It may be addressed 
by the central computer and given certain activity commands or, if 
programmed appropriately, may Initiate such commands in response to 
specific substation conditions.
4.2 Selection of Fault Analysis Techniques
The question arises as to the most appropriate protection schemes 
for implementation in the aforementioned subsystem configuration. Â list 








f) Pilot (pilot wire, power line carrier, or microwave)
The line protection schemes can be represented by two groups: 
those which use only local substation data (a - e) or those which require 
information from both terminals of the line (f). The first technique is 
very popular because it requires no communication links between substa­
tions, however, as will be seen, distinct advantages exist with the 
latter systems. Recent surveys have shown that with most major utilities 
virtually all transmission lines (345 kv and above) are protected using 
some form of Intersubstation communication link. [33] Since both of 
these techniques are widely used, our primary protection DCU should be 
capable of carrying out both, as well as some of the newer techniques 
recently proposed.
Of the first group suggested by Westinghouse, distance (imped­
ance) relaying is the most popular and offers the greatest advantage. As 
typically implemented, these relays use V, I information to calculate the 
impedance to the fault. Knowing the impedance of the healthy line, it is 
easily determined whether the fault is internal or external to the protec­
tion transmission line segment. We have shown that considerable effort 
has been expended in applying numerical analysis techniques to implement 
the required impedance calculation on a digital computer. These efforts 
have shown the job can be accomplished but offers few performance advan­
tages over present systems, other than the distinct and necessary
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advantage of system integration. It seems logical, however, that for 
back-up protection where speed is not of primary importance. Impedance 
relaying will prove an excellent technique.
To implement the system, two basic functions are required: fault 
detection and impedance calculation. Fault detection could be derived 
from dedicated analog hardware which determines the existence of high 
frequency transients on the line during fault periods. However, if total 
implementation in software is desired, the cycle-to-cycle comparison 
technique would be quite acceptable, particularly for back-up protection. 
The impedance calculation could use one of the more sophisticated numeri­
cal analysis techniques pursued by numerous researchers. However, dis­
tinct advantages seem to be gained from using the recent IBM suggestion 
of Walsh function calculations. [34] Software implementation could be 
as follows.
4.3 Protection Software Requirements for Distance Relaying
A consideration of the software requirements for the individual 
DCU subsystems is now appropriate. As shown in Flow Chart 2, the back-up 
protection DCU must receive line information in order to determine the 
existence of a fault. This information comes in the form of three-phase 
voltages, three-phase currents, and a residual current. This information 
would be treated by the DCU in the following fashion. A fault detection 
subroutine would analyze the data to determine if a fault has occurred.
In a parallel sense, as a part of the fault detection routine, a high 
current trend analysis could be performed to determine if line loading 
was approaching a maximum limit defined either by line capacity or 
protection settings. Should a fault be detected, another set of parallel 


























































FLOW CHART 2 (CONT.)
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the type and nature of fault on the transmission line. The existence of 
the fault is alarmed through the SCCU to the central dispatcher. An 
interrupt to the data and control DCU initiates appropriate fault data 
collection. If a high overcurrent check is negative, a subsequent rou­
tine to calculate impedance to perform zone discrimination is initiated. 
Once the impedance has been determined and the appropriate zone for the 
fault selected, appropriate action is determined according to fault loca­
tion and the breakers are either tripped or a time delay trip is initiated 
to allow remote terminal clearing. At this point, a breaker trip check 
is performed to detect a failure of the circuit breaker to de-energize 
the line. Two trip signal attempts are made and if breaker activity is 
not detected, a breaker failure routine is initiated. If the trips are 
successful, a synchronized reclosing action is initiated. This is to 
allow for the possibility of the existence of a temporary fault. Westing- 
house reports that less than ten percent of all faults are of a permanent 
nature. [35] Therefore, a recloslng attempt is justified. If the fault 
is cleared after reclosing, the fault clearing is alarmed and the primary 
protection DCU returns to a normal state. If the fault is not cleared, a 
breaker trip signal with lockout is initiated and another breaker trip 
check is performed. Again, if the breaker falls, the breaker failure 
routine is initiated. However, if the second trip is successful, the 
breaker locks out, permanently de-energizing the line.
4.4 Evaluation of Trend Analysis and Fault Detection Routine
To prove the feasibility of simultaneous fault detection and trend 
analysis, an algorithm was developed and tested on a Digital Equipment 
Corporation PDP-8 computer. The basis for the fault detection routine is 
the previously discussed work by Mann and Morrison (See Section 2.2). [36]
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The purpose of this routine is to rapidly detect a fault condition and 
initiate appropriate action. The trend detection routine is likewise 
exercised on a regular basis to detect an overload trend and provide an 
interrupt to the security DCU, which performs a detailed trend analysis. 
Since no microcomputer equipment was available for use, the PDP-8 was 
chosen. While it differs considerably from most microcomputers, it is 
possible to program the machine using an instruction set somewhat like a 
typical microcomputer. An experienced programmer will immediately notice 
that the routine is inefficient and crude by PDP-8 standards. Indulgence 
is asked on this point, since an attempt was made to formulate the 
routine using only fundamental commands and operations.
Present cycle to past cycle amplitude comparison was used to 
monitor the voltage of all three phases of a single transmission line. 
Since each phase must be monitored, from a programming viewpoint the 
amplitude comparison scheme consists of three identical routines. For 
this reason, a single phase routine was devised and tested. Three of 
these routines (1 per phase) would be used for total fault detection on 
a transmission line.
Trend detection was performed by successive application of the
derivative approximation technique given by [37]
dx ~ Xn - Xn-1
dt t = tn h
where h is the time increment between successive samples. If the sample 
rate is periodic and synchronized to 60 hertz, "h" is constant and, since 
only relative derivative calculations are required, it can be ignored. 
Hence to approximate the envelope of the current sinusoid by a straight 
line requires a simple data subtraction. The result of this subtraction 
can be compared to some pre-set minimum. If the minimum is exceeded, a
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high trend condition Is indicated. To secure from false indications 
due to transient conditions, the routine would be exercised success­
ively and several positive indications of high trend would be required 
before the condition was indicated.
Note that considerable "data handling" programming was required, 
due to the limited capability of the PDP-8 facility which was used. 
Definitions of program variables are as follows:
LI: Number of non-correlating samples required to indicate a
fault.
OL: Number of samples per cycle.
TO: Allowable degree of non-correlation between fault
samples.
CO: Cumulative total of non-correlating fault samples.
OD: Array or data "stack".
00: "Stack" pointer.
DA: Value of last sample.
ID: Allowable degree of non-correlation between trend samples.
TR: Number of non-correlating samples required to indicate
high trend.
TN: Cumulative total of non-correlating trend samples.
For purposes of evaluation, the variables were set at the following values: 
LI = 5 OL = 15 TO = 0.10 TR = 3 TD = 0.02 
With these variables, the routine assumes 15 samples per cycle and will
compare these samples on a regular basis until 5 fault samples are out of
tolerance by the value t 10%. When 5 non-correlating samples are reached,
a fault is indicated. Trend tolerance is set at +2% and high trend is
indicated when 3 excessive samples occur.
To provide a test for this routine, fault data was obtained from
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company. This data was for a phase to ground
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fault recorded at Seminole substation In 1974, as shown in Figure 18.
Data samples were taken from the output of a high resolution analog re­
corder. [38] The successful performance of the routine in detecting the 
line to ground fault condition and in detecting high load trend is indi­
cated by the program outputs shown in Tables 1-3.
Table 1 shows simulated fault data samples for the phase to
ground fault shown in Figure 18. The first 21 samples represent a
healthy sinusoid and samples 22-26 represent fault data. As shown, the 
fault routine detects the presence of the fault samples and the fault 
counter is successively incremented until the preset number of 5 fault 
samples is reached. At this point, the fault alarm is generated. Table 
2 includes sinusoidal data upon which a slow loading trend has been 
superimposed. The fault routine ignores this loading trend while the 
trend analysis routine detects the condition. Following the preset 
number of 3 successive positive trend tests, the high trend condition 
is indicated.
Table 3 shows sinusoidal data which has been "spiked" with
individual samples of spurious data. These could represent single A/D
mlsconversions, transient line conditions, line switching surges, light­
ning surges, etc. The fault routine detects the samples but automatically 
decrements and resets the counter upon encountering subsequent healthy 
samples. No fault is indicated.
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Fault Detection and Trend Analysis Program 
Figure 17
01.01 S LI=5; S 0L=15; S TO=.l; S TR=3; S C0=0; S TD=.02; S TN=0
01.20 F 0C=1,0L; DO 10.1; S 0D(0C)=DA 
01.25 S TS=-2
01.30 S 0C=0L





















04.60 D 10.4; G 1.7
04.70 8 00=00-1













07.50 I (81)7.6,7.6;8 TN=TlW-2





07.80 I (81)7.9,7.9; T "ALARM"!
07.90 S S1=D1
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Figure 18
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Fault Data and Output
Table 1































































Trend Data and Output
Table 2
*G .-.7238
DATA= 0.3335 0 TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0
DATA» 0.6893 :.9732
DATA» 0.9268 1 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
DATA» 1.0047 ;.0549
DATA» 0.9088 0 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
DATA» 0.6551 :.9541
DATA» 0.2872 0 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
DATA» -0.1317 -..6878
DATA» -0.5292 0 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
DATA» -0.8363 ;.3015
DATA» -0.9997 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
DATA» -0.9904 :0.1383
DATA» -0.8095 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
DATA» -0.4878 :0.5555
DATA» -0.0806 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
:0.3419 ;0.8778
0 TREND» 0 COUNTER» 0 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
:.7066 :1.0491
0 TREND» 0 COUNTER» 0 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
;.9500 ;1.0392
1 TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
:.0298 :0.8494
0 TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
;.9315 :0.5118
0 TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
:.6715 ;0.0846
0 TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0 0 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
;.2943 ;.3587
- TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0 0 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
: 0.1350 :.7412
TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0 0 TREND» 2 COUNTER» 0
:0.5423 :.9965
_ TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0 1 TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
:0.8371 :.0801
- TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0 0 TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
:1.0243 .*.9768
- TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0 0 TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
:1.0148 :.7041
- TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0 0 TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
;0.8294 :.3086
- TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0 TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
;0.4998 ;0.1416
- TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0 TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
:0.08260 :0.5686
0 TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0 TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
:.3503 :0.8985
0 TREND» 1 COUNTER» 0 TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
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1.0738
TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
1.0637
TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
0.8693
TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
0.5238
TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
0.0865
TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
.3671
TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
.7585
TREND» 3 COUNTER» 0
.0197 
lALARM
TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
.1051
TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
.9995
TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
.7204
TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
.3157
TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
0.1448
TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
0.5818
TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
:0.9192
TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
-.1.0985
TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
:1.0881
TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
:0.8892
TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
:0.5357
TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
: 0.0885 
0 TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
:.3754 
0 TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
:.7758 
1 TREND» 4 COUNTER» 0
:.0429
lALARM
TREND» 5 COUNTER» 0
:.1303 
1 TREND» 5 COUNTER» 0
;.0221 
0 TREND» 5 COUNTER» 0
:.7367 
0 TREND» 5 COUNTER» 0
:.3228
TREND» 5 COUNTER» 0
END
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TREND- 0 COUNTER­ 0
.68812
TREND» 0 COUNTER­ 0
.92376
TREND» 0 COUNTER» 0
.99967
TREND» 0 COUNTER­ 0
.90272
TREND» 0 COUNTER­ 0
.64970
TREND» 0 COUNTER» 0
.28432
TREND» 0 COUNTER­ 0
0.00021
TREND» 0 COUNTER» 1
0.52223
TREND- 0 COUNTER­ 0
0.82394
TREND- 0 COUNTER­ 0
0.98320
TREND- 0 COUNTER» 0
0.97244
TREND- 0 COUNTER­ 0
0.79354
TREND- 0 COUNTER­ 0
0.47744
TREND- 0 COUNTER» 0
0.78770
TREND- 0 COUNTER- 1
.33352
TREND- 0 COUNTER- 0
.68813 



































































































4.5 Selection of Primary Protection Technique
As pointed out in Section 4.2, digital distance relaying Is 
most appropriate for backup schemes. The selection of a primary protec­
tion technique Is therefore necessary. An analysis of the protection 
schemes used by utilities on EHV lines shows a preference for "pilot" 
type protection utilizing Intra-substatlon communication links. [39]
The availability of high speed, secure digital data links makes Imple­
mentation of pilot relaying schemes on digital computers quite possible. 
Numerous relaying techniques fall Into this category. Including pilot 
wire differential, amplitude comparison, phase comparison, remote 
transfer tripping, directional comparison, etc. A technique used by 
such companies as American Electric Power, Commonwealth Edison, and 
Southern California Edison Is phase comparison relaying. This is a 
very reliable and secure technique, as pointed out by Van C. Warrington, 
and has numerous advantages. Including Immunity to such effects as 
power swings, switching of series capacitors, loss of potential, and 
mutual inductance of zero sequence currents from parallel lines, [40]
He points out these disadvantages due to the usual practice of reducing 
phase and residual currents to a single transmitted signal: loss of
discriminating margin and delay In carrier operation. Both of these 
disadvantages are easily overcome using multiple channel or high speed 
serial, continuous data links. With these advantages and ease of Imple­
mentation, the phase comparison scheme seems, at face value, a logical 
choice for digital relaying.
The concept of amplitude comparison, the dual of phase comparison. 
Is quite simple. Voltage and/or currents from both terminals of the 
line are compared on a continuous basis to detect abnormal phase or
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amplitude relationships. For amplitude comparison, as traditionally 
applied, two current signals of amplitudes A and B would be rectified 
and subtracted and the result squared to produce a trip signal.
Figure 19
The attenuation and phase displacement of long-distance communication 
links previously prevented the use of this scheme for most lines. Since 
attenuation is of little consequence to phase comparison schemes, they 
were used, but compensation for phase shift was necessary. Since phase 
comparison is basically a comparison of wave forms in time, this tech­
nique introduces delay in tripping. However, a modification of these 
techniques can be applied to digital relaying quite successfully. The 
amplitudes of the waveforms can be synchronously sampled at both termi­
nals of the transmission line and the data from one terminal transmitted 
over a high speed data link to the other terminal for comparison. Trans­
mission of information would be digital rather than the actual analog 
signal, therefore attenuation would not be a problem. A schematic 
representation of a digital amplitude comparison relaying scheme is shown 
in Figure 20. Each terminal of the line is protected by a dedicated 
amplitude comparison DCU. These units are linked by a high speed, micro­
wave communication system. As indicated, each DCU receives data from 















Digital Amplitude Comparison Technique 
Figure 20
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necessary transmittlng time adjustments. Throiigli current or an external 
fault at point B will generate similar waveforms at bus I and bus 2. 
However, an internal fault would be immediately detected due to the 
shift in currents indicated by the arrow labeled Virtually simultan­
eous tripping of both terminals would be accomplished, but as a precaution, 
additional trip signals would be transmitted over the communication link 
by both DCU's. Operation could be extremely fast by current standards, 
and immunity to power swings should be exhibited.
4.6 Software Requirements for Amplitude Comparison Relaying
The primary protection scheme outlined in Flow Chart 3 represents 
the necessary steps the protection DCU would take for amplitude compari­
son protection. Local line terminal information, as well as remote 
terminal information, would be obtained by the computer in a synchronous 
fashion. This data would be compared, as shown, and analyzed to deter­
mine if a fault exists internal to the protected line segment. If no 
fault exists, a check for high trend is made to determine a dangerous 
overload possibility. Should an overload exist, the overload is alarmed 
to the SCCU for passing to the central computer and subsequently to the 
system operator. In addition, the high trend is flagged to the security 
DCU which does a detailed overload analysis and projects time to trip. 
Should no high trend exist, of course, the system returns to its beginning 
state and compares a new set of data. Should a fault be indicated, the 
system protection DCU flags the fault to the SCCU, transmits a remote 
trip signal, and trips the local breaker. Subsequent to initiating a 
breaker trip signal, a breaker failure reclosing routine is initiated, as 







































is made to obtain new system data. Should the fault be of a permanent 
nature, of course a breaker lockout is indicated.
The fault detection routine has, as yet, not been defined. It is 
necessary that we efficiently compare the local and remote data to detect 
an internal fault condition, while maintaining insensitivity to all high 
through currents and external faults. The fastest and most secure way of 
accomplishing this task seems to be an instantaneous sample comparison 
routine, similar in theory to the single terminal, cycle-to-cycle fault 
detection technique previously discussed.[41]
It would be necessary that the waveform samples taken at each 
line terminal be time synchronized to make the comparison valid. This 
could be easily accomplished using several available techniques. A 
synchronizing signal could be transmitted between the respective DCU's 
to keep them and their peripherals locked in time. Should this sync 
channel be undesirable, a local stable oscillator, synchronized by refer­
ence to WWVB is quite feasible. [42] The National Bureau of Standards 
has shown that time readings of i 50 microseconds accuracy are possible. 
Recall that 1“ of phase shift of 60 hertz is approximately 46 microseconds. 
Hence, t 1° sample time synchronization should be possible. This is well 
within our system requirements.
Assuming that time synchronized samples are available, 
they must be transmitted to the opposite line terminal. Transmission time 
is not negligible and introduces a delay which must be recognized. How­
ever, since execution time for the fault detection routine is long 
compared to the transmission time of the coded instantaneous values, no 
problems will exist as long as the correct samples are compared. To. 
assure comparison of samples collected at the same point in time, the
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sample can carry a time "address" indicating the point In cycle when It 
was taken. This check, along with the synchronized DCU's, should assure 
proper comparison of data. Since samples will not exactly compare, a 
tolerance must be set. This tolerance can also serve as a control on 
comparison sensitivity. Tripping on brief transients can be eliminated 
by the Integrating effect achieved when several non-correlating samples 
are required to Indicate a trip. Controlling the number of negative 
comparisons required to trip will also control sensitivity and provide 
discrimination between faults and pseudo-faults.
4.7 Microcomputer Selection
Numerous factors must be considered when selecting a microcomputer 
system. Some of these factors are listed below:
1. Word length








10. Peripheral support devices
11. Input/output requirements
The optimum architecture and set of characteristics for the DCU 
and SCCU microcomputers can only be achieved by specific designs which 
meet the special data handling. Interrupt, and other requirements 
unique to each subsystem. However, It Is possible to use commercially
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available microcomputers to achieve a functional hardware configuration.
The requirements a microprocessor must meet to perform the various func­
tions of the DCU's are specific, but not harsh. A priority interrupt 
system is absolutely necessary in this application. It may be necessary 
in complex control schemes for several DCU's (local and remote) to address 
a single DCU on an interrupt basis. A hierarchy must be established to 
handle these interrupts. Absolute priority must be given to communication 
between two DCU's protecting the terminals of a transmission line. The 
security DCU must also have a priority interrupt system. When a protec­
tion DCU detects a high trend condition, the security DCU must immediately 
perform a trend analysis routine and present the results to the SCCU for 
transmission. Programmed Interrupts could be used, but cause unnecessary 
program complexity.
Word length may vary between eight to sixteen bits, according to 
the specific function of the DCU. A secondary protection DCU may be 
required to calculate impedance, therefore, a sixteen bit machine might be 
appropriate. For a DCU which primarily monitors the status of equipment, 
an eight bit machine would be fully adequate. There exists no requirement 
that all machines be identical, therefore machine specifications would be 
set according to functional requirements.
Due to the large degree of distributed processing, speed is not of 
primary importance for most of the DCU's. However, in the case of the 
protection units, the maximum speed practical is desired. A machine with 
better than 1 microsecond cycle time is preferred. While this is fast by 
today's standards, for microcomputers, several machines exist which can 
provide this speed.
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A feature which will greatly increase the speed and efficiency 
of data handling by the DCU's is direct memory access (DMA). Normal 
input/output is accomplished by programmed word transfers supervised by 
the microprocessor. This is a time consuming operation when large 
amounts of data must be moved. DMA capability allows rapid transmittal 
of data between the microcomputer memory and peripheral devices. This 
could be especially helpful to the data DCU's which must output consider­
able information to magnetic tape storage units. The Rockwell PPS-8 
system has a sophisticated DMA capability provided by a special peripheral 
device called a Direct Memory Access Controller. [43] To allow efficient 
programming, other features, such as multiple accumulaters, stack pointers, 
multiple address modes, etc. might be useful. Since several DCU's will 
be interconnected, such devices as Motorola's Peripheral Interface 
Adapter (PIA) could be very useful. This device would allow the inter­
facing of two systems over two bidirectional data buses and provide four 
separate control lines. [44]
Several commercial microprocessors exist having characteristics 
which meet most of our system requirements. Both Rockwell and Mostek 
offer machines with acceptable interrupt architecture and DMA capability. 
[45, 46] Both of these eight bit machines offer single chip CPU construc­
tion and utilize PMOS technology. While the speed of these machines is 
less than desirable, they would serve well for certain of the data and 
control DCU subsystems.
More stringent computational requirements may require a sixteen 
bit CPU machine. Several such microprocessors are available, including 
the National IMP-16 and the Western Digital 1600.[47, 48] Both of these 
machines are of multiple-chip construction. The Western Digital machine
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is of particular significance, since it offers an acceptable interrupt 
capability, DMA ability, 64k address capacity, and multiple CPU registers. 
The speed of this machine by microcomputer standards is exceptionally 
fast, offering a 0.6 microsecond per data word register add time. A 

















Intel 8080 8 bit S 8 64k 2 1
Mostek 5065 8 bit S 8 32k 10 3
Motorola 6800 8 bit S 8 64k 2 2
National IMP-16 16 bit M 16 64k 4.6 2
Rockwell PPS-8 8 bit S 8 16k 4 1
Western Digital 1600 16 bit M 16 64k 0.6 16
* Each microprocessor listed has an interrupt structure and direct 
memory access.
It should be pointed out that judging by today's research, these 
machines may well be obsolete by the end of 1976. New developments in 
transistor-transistor logic (TTL) and injection-injection logic (IIL) 
could replace present large-scale integration (LSI) techniques. The 
result will probably be more versatile machines showing considerable 
speed improvement.
CHAPTER V
SYSTEM ADVANTAGES AND OPERATING EXAMPLES
5.1 Introduction
An overall list of the capabilities of the proposed substation 
automation system includes the following:
1. System monitoring, alarming, and indication
2. All supervisory control and data acquisition functions
3. Local emergency automatic control
4. Local data preprocessing
5. Load management
6. System state estimation
7. Line overload trend analysis
8. Interactive relaying (higher order protection)
9. Adaptive system protection
10. Self diagnostic and alarming.
While a number of these functions can be currently performed in a limited 
fashion, no integrated, interactive system exists capable of performing 
them all.
5.2 System Reliability
As was previously determined, the critical factor in any substa­
tion control system which includes system protection is the "availability" 
of the system to perform the protection function (i.e. system reliability).
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A 1958 CIGRE study classified the causes for protection system mlsopera- 
tlon during fault conditions. [49]
TABLE 5
CAUSE OF FAILURE PERCENT
Relay failure 43%
Circuit breaker Interrupter 13.5%
AC wiring 12%




Breaker auxiliary switches 2.5%
DC supply 1%
It can be seen that Improvement In the sensitivity, selectivity, 
and reliability of the decision hardware (relays) would significantly 
improve overall system protection. To provide reliability, the system 
has five levels of security to assure 100% availability under fault 
conditions.
The first level of security Is a function of the nature of the 
microcomputer based protection unit. The microcomputer has the capabil­
ity of performing self checks and diagnostics and indicating abnormal 
conditions, taking corrective action, or failing "soft". For example, 
most systems have a power supply monitor capability which allows a coordi­
nated switch-over to an alternate battery power supply In case of primary 
power supply failure. To protect Its system from the consequences of power 
transients, power Interruption, component failure, one manufacturer lists 
the following features: operation monitor alarm, system safe line, system 
reset line, power fall detection, and automatic restart.[50] Additional
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software programmed self checks and diagnostics can also be provided to 
maximize the possibility of detecting an individual protection unit 
failure.
A second level of security is the traditional back-up system or 
100% redundancy concept. A secondary protection DCU has been provided 
whose operation is superimposed upon and parallel to the primary detection 
unit. This independence prevents dual failure and essentially eliminates 
most causes of overall protection system misoperation. A third level of 
defense is provided by the security DCU. This unit regularly accesses 
each protection DCU and checks operations from a terminal viewpoint. As 
previously explained, the unit would detect the ability of the protection 
DCU to trip the breaker in response to fault data. The security DCU 
could initiate corrective action where appropriate should it determine 
the "unavailability" of a protection DCU.
A fourth and fifth level of security is easily provided by taking 
advantage of the communication link to the central computer and the con­
trol capability of the security DCU. When a failure is determined at 
any level in the protection system, the SCCU can be addressed by the 
security DCU and a message describing the failure can be transmitted to 
the central computer via the communication link. The central computer 
would pass this message to the system operator who can take corrective 
action. While this operation is taking place, it would also be possible 
to switch in, for example, a spare CPU to take the place of the one which 
has failed. Wliile requiring considerable ingenuity in proper switching 
and interfacing, it is certainly possible.
A very reliable system design with self checking and failure 
alarming capability has been provided, yielding the possibility of
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an acceptable operating reliability. However, to this point, adequate 
reliability on the part of individual components has been assumed. 
Obviously, overall system reliability is a direct function of individual 
subsystem and component reliability. Microcomputers have an industrial 
reputation as very reliable control devices, but due to the brief time 
most microcomputers have been in service, virtually no long-term evalua­
tions have been made. Several subjective points can be made to support 
the conclusions that they offer high reliability. Appendix II is a 
list of successful microcomputer applications, some of which represent 
hostile environments. For example, a microcomputer has been used to 
control reactor vessel welding equipment. In this application, the 
computer was located on top of the welding apparatus in a high heat, 
high noise environment and operated continuously, performing without 
failure or misoperation. [51] In other applications, microcomputer sys­
tems have controlled glass bottle manufacturing, performed remote site 
environmental monitoring, functioned as urban traffic controllers, etc. 
All of these applications represent unique environmental conditions 
where microcomputer systems have functioned admirably.
Two other functions point to a high level of reliability from
microcomputers when compared to either IC constructed solid-state devices 
or typical minicomputers. Microcomputers contain no moving parts, a 
high failure point for most minicomputer systems, and when compared 
to IC constructed devices, microcomputers have far fewer interconnec­
tions to fail. It has long been known that with IC systems, most 
failures are due to the interconnections between components, rather than 
failures of the components themselves. For example, a 16 pin IC will
introduce about 30 interconnections to the system. There are 16
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interconnections from the chip to the lead frame, 16 from the lead frame 
to the PC card, and approximately 2 interconnections from the PC card to 
the back plane and 2 interconnections from back plane to back plane point 
per IC. Obviously, the way to reduce failure and increase reliability 
is to simplify the IC system as much as possible. This can be done 
by replacing IC construction with LSI, microcomputer type construction. 
One ROM can replace 40 to 50 IC's, thus eliminating approximately 1800 
interconnections. It is easy to see that superior reliability should 
result from microcomputer construction as compared to IC, solid-state 
construction.
A reliability evaluation of a microcomputer composed of the 
typical subsystem modules has been performed by LeRoy Anderson of the 
COMSTAR Corporation. [52] Dr. Anderson assumed that the failure of 1 sub­
system of the microcomputer represented an overall system failure. He 
also assumed 100% use of all memory locations, continuous duty for each 
module of the system, and no redundancy or special system provisions to 
improve reliability. Even with this stringent set of conditions, he 
showed excellent reliability figures for a typical microcomputer. To 
arrive at his conclusions, he evaluated the machine based on the fail­
ure rate (FR) of the individual components found in each module. Such 
information is readily available from integrated circuit manufacturers, 
such as Texas Instruments and Fairchild. He then assumed that the fail­
ure rate of each module is then the sum of the failure rates of each 
individual component. A composite failure rate (CFR) can be derived by 
summing the individual module failure rates. Dividing the CFR into 10^ 
hours yields an MTBF in hours for 100% duty cycle on all components. An 











MTBF = 10^ hours/CRF = 10^ hours/89.38 = 11,188 hours
It should be noted that the figures for this evaluation are two 
years old and therefore do not reflect recent improvements by micro­
computer manufacturers. One could only expect that these improvements 
have resulted in improved reliability.
A comparison of microcomputer and electromechanical system 
reliability is desirable. However, the lack of statistical data and 
the nature of reliability specifications for electromechanical relays 
prohibit such comparisons. No reliability or failure data is avail­
able on protective relays and successful performance in accelerated 
life tests (e.g. 10^ contact closures) is no indication of in service 
reliability. Hence, no such comparisons can be made at this writing.
5.3 System Advantages
Economic evaluations must lead to an acceptable cost if 
acceptance by the utility industry is to be expected. While exact 
comparisons are impossible, relative cost estimates can be made. A
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review of the cost data included in several of the references shows 
complete microcomputer systems equivalent to the required capability 
of a protection DCU can be purchased quite economically. Even 
when one considers the required peripheral support equipment, the 
system cost should fall below the estimated cost per line terminal 
currently required for protection. Since the automation system's 
functional capability goes beyond protection, at this writing, the 
actual cost per function should prove approximately 20% less than 
current systems.
The configuration of the protection system interfaced 
through the substation communication and control unit to the central 
computer, yields several operating advantages. In addition to 
the capability of detecting protection system failure, the protection 
system can perform overload trend analysis and through the communi­
cation system warn the operator of impending line or equipment 
overloads. A trend detection routine was designed to operate in 
parallel with the fault detection routine. Since the line is con­
tinuously monitored for fault conditions, it is relatively easy to 
incorporate a trend monitor. A trend detector can be programmed 
with the line load capability, and since it contains the protection 
system limits, it can detect a line loading trend which is either 
approaching a line overload or protection system trip condition. This
capability is totally lacking in present systems and would provide an
extra degree of system security. Major system instabilities can re­
sult from the inadvertent tripping of a heavily loaded line. The 
resulting power surges can cause false operation of protective relays
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and result In a segmented system with severe generatlon-load imbal­
ance. Forewarning a system operator of the impending overload or 
trip situation virtually eliminates the problem.
Certain operating procedures could give even greater 
security. An operator could enter his tie-line loading intentions 
into the central computer which could, in turn, check the proposed 
loading against the line capability and protection equipment 
settings. Should the proposed loading be acceptable, the computer 
could so indicate to the system operator. This simple step could 
eliminate the possibility of a major system collapse.
Another advantage of the proposed integrated automation sys­
tem can be called adaptive relaying. As you recall, current protec­
tion system parameters are set by hand adjustment of the protection 
equipment. No provision is made for adjusting the parameters to fit 
specific situations or adjusting them in a remote fashion. Hence, 
considerable "tolerance" must be allowed in the protection schemes 
to cover a broad range of operating conditions. In certain operat­
ing situations, the ability to remotely alter the protection para­
meters could be valuable. Temporary line overload could be allowed 
simply by properly adjusting the protection system settings to 
allow the condition. While this function is virtually impossible 
with present systems, it is easily accomplished using the proposed 
digital protection scheme. Each protection DCU can be addressed indi­
vidually by the system operator through the central computer-SCCU 
hardware and the protection settings can be set to any specified value. 
The operator need not be familiar with the line specifically, for all 
appropriate information can be stored in the central computer. A
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single entry in the form of the desired magnitude of temporary overload 
could be made. Appropriate protection settings would be generated by 
the central computer and the protection DCU located at the substation 
could be automatically reprogrammed to fit the situation. This could be 
of considerable value in the case of interconnections between systems, 
where emergency power flow might be required, but where light loading or 
no power flow is the normal condition. Under central computer control, 
the technique could also be used to adjust the protection system properly 
to break the system into matched generation-load segments under emergency 
conditions.
5.4 Case Study; Northeast Blackout
At 5:16:11 P.M. on November 9, 1965, 28 utilities were affected 
by the worst power failure in man's history. [53] Large sections of the 
northeast were without power for periods lasting up to one-half day. The 
conditions leading up to this situation are herein reviewed, since the 
cause of the outage is directly treated in this work.
Beck Station of Ontario Hydro provides power to the Toronto area 
over 5-230 kv transmission lines. An emergency outage at the Ontario 
Hydro steam plant at Lakeview had caused heavy loading of these lines in 
recent months. On the day of the failure, these lines carried 1500 mega­
watts. Immediately prior to the failure, an interconnection with PASNY 
(Power Authority State of New York) was carrying 1800 megawatts south and 
east over heavily loaded lines. The protection for Ontario Hydro's lines 
was provided by primary and back-up relaying systems. The back-up system 
had been installed in 1951 and reset in 1963 to its present protection 
settings. The level of protection of what we shall call line A had been 
set at 375 megawatts. It should be noted that this level was considerably
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below line capability, but operation at higher levels was never considered 
necessary. The setting was specifically low to extend protection past 
the next substation.
On the day of the outage, line A had averaged 356 megawatts power 
flow north. At 5:16:11 P.M. the loading on line A exceeded the back-up 
protection limits and line A tripped out. The load which had been carried 
by line A was immediately distributed over the remaining four lines.
Each of these lines had similar protection settings and became overloaded 
and in 2.7 seconds, all five lines had tripped and locked out. The 
approximate 1500 megawatts being carried by these lines was superimposed 
on the 1800 megawatts flowing east and south in the PASNY system. At 
5:16:14.5, this backbone 345 kv system was overloaded by the power surge 
and all breakers tripped, breaking the system into many segments, each 
with generation-load imbalance. Many utilities were forced to immediate 
emergency shutdown, while others were able to hold on for as long as 14 
minutes. In short, inside of 15 minutes, the entire Northeast was blacked 
out. For some utilities, it would take as long as 12 hours to bring 
their systems back.
Several factors should be noted at this point. The power failure 
in this case was not precipitated by hardware failure. The back-up relay 
system functioned perfectly, tripping the breakers when protection limits 
were exceeded. While a more "intelligent" control system could have 
prevented the catastrophe, the cause of this failure was basically "human 
error". As pointed out in the report to the President, "personnel operat­
ing the Ontario Hydro system were not aware that the relay was set to 
operate at the 375 megawatt level". [54] Several congressmen were later 
to ask Federal Power Commission and Utility Representatives questions 
which can be summarized by "do you mean the people operating the utility
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systems don't know about their own equipment?" While the question 
reflects the uninformed nature of congressmen, it does have a degree 
of truth which should be pursued. Seldom do operating personnel and 
dispatchers have accurate, real-time information concerning the protec­
tion system. If the protection system is broad, allowing wide operating 
margins, this usually protects the system dispatcher and an uninformed 
dispatcher can therefore cause no problem. However, as in the case of 
the northeast blackout, a lack of knowledge concerning the protection 
system can be disastrous.
The power failure brought to light another serious problem.
Many utilities were able to hold their systems together for several 
minutes (up to 14), plenty of time to take emergency corrective action.
The fact that some of these utilities were pulled down at all can be 
directly attributed to human error or indecision. The Federal Power 
Commission report stated that much of the severity of the problem was 
caused by the failure of system operators to take immediate and decisive 
action. [55] Many did not believe their instrumentation was correctly 
indicating the situation and therefore took no corrective action. It 
should be noted that system dispatchers were in a highly unusual situation 
and faced with conditions and operating decisions which had never been 
seen before; therefore, no real blame should be placed on them. What is 
pointed out is the necessity of removing such critical decisions from 
operating personnel. Some utilities only had minutes to make the proper 
decision and carry out a complicated series of operations to save their 
systems. The speed requirements were far too severe for direct human 
decision making and control. Automation of the necessary operations and 
control decisions is therefore the only answer.
97
The recommendations of the Federal Power Commission included 
the following: [56]
"Close and frequent checks of relay settings"
"Load management"
"Review of relay applications"
While the northeast blackout precipitated major efforts by 
utilities to solve the problem of returning the system to a normal condi­
tion after a major catastrophe (e.g. under-frequency relaying and stand­
by power), virtually no work has been done toward preventing the event 
from ever occurring again.
To show that the cause of the northeast failure was not totally 
unique, two other very similar events are cited. A six state area was 
affected on January 28, 1965, by a similar chain of events, precipitated 
by a loose connection in a protective relay circuit at Ft. Randall Power 
Plant, South Dakota. [57] On July 11, 1966, a major power outage in 
Nebraska was caused by "incorrect relay operation" at Ft. Randall-Columbus 
station under "heavy loading" conditions on a 230 kv line. [58] The 
relay had been operating "without fault" for six years. These and other 
instances point toward the need for system automation including more 
advanced protection systems, overload trend analysis, and emergency load 
control measures. The previously defined system has been specifically 
designed to offer these advantages.
5.5 Explanation of System Operation Using a Hypothetical Case
The sequence of events leading up to and following the northeast 
power failure would have been considerably different had the previously 
developed substation automation system been in operation on the Ontario 
Hydro system. The following is a hypothetical chain of events suggesting
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how the substation automation system might have handled the contingency. 
Assume the same operating conditions and relay settings prior to the 
failure.
Had the automation system been in operation, the system dis­
patcher could have presented his loading intentions to the central com­
puter, which in turn could have checked the settings on all the lines 
and informed the operator that the protection settings would not allow 
this heavy loading. This could well have prevented the entire episode, 
since the lines had been loaded progressively higher over recent months. 
The dispatcher could have remotely changed the protection settings to 
allow this loading level.
Assume this previous step had not been taken. At some point 
prior to 5:16 P.M. on November 9, a protection DCU would have exercised 
its trend detection routine and recognized that a loading trend existed 
which was approaching protection system limits. The security DCU would 
have been accessed through priority interrupt and a trend analysis of the 
five-230 kv lines would have been performed. If the loading was slow, 
the central computer could have been accessed through the substation 
communication and control unit and informed of the dangerous trend and a 
projected time-to-trip for the lines. The central computer would have 
indicated this condition to the system dispatcher who could have taken 
immediate steps to prevent further loading. It is possible, though 
unlikely, that the loading trend was rapid, therefore, not allowing time 
for dispatcher action. Therefore, in parallel with the above activity, 
each protection DCU under the control of the security DCU could reset 
its protection settings to allow these temporary loading conditions 
rather than tripping out the lines. This is possible since each DCU
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can be programmed with the theoretical line loading limits of the trans­
mission lines. Had line A tripped due to a permanent fault condition, 
the other lines could easily have readjusted their protective settings 
to handle the overload. Recall these facts: the lines took a full 2.7 
seconds to trip out and each line was loaded well below its capabilities. 
Readjustment of the settings would have taken only a few milliseconds. 
Recall also that we are using a "pilot" comparison protection scheme 
for primary relaying which has an inherent immunity to power swings.
If these three levels of events had failed to prevent the catas­
trophe, the substation automation system could have aided in preventing 
total system collapse. Under central computer control, substation con­
trol systems could have performed emergency load management (load 
shedding) to prevent major load-generation imbalance. In addition, 
each substation could have been accessed by the dispatcher and appro­
priate network reconfiguration could have been performed in a matter of 
minutes rather than hours. In short, the system could have prevented 




Consideration of the research as a whole points to several 
advantages which would result from use of the proposed substation auto­
mation system. A list of these advantages would be extensive and would 
include:
1) Distributed Data Processing and Control.
2) Limited Transmission of Data to a Central Computer.
3) Hardware Configuration Offering High Reliability.
4) Trend Analysis and Overload Alarming.
5) Local Emergency Load Control.
6) Protection System Self-Checking and Diagnostics.
7) Remotely Adaptive Relaying Parameters.
8) Total Substation Stand-Alone Control Capability.
9) Reduced Electromagnetic Interference by Optical 
Waveguide Communications.
10) Improved System Protection by Digital Amplitude 
Comparison Relaying.
In addition, the system offers extreme flexibility by using ad­
vanced microcomputers as the major control hardware. The reliability, 
speed, and control versatility offered by the microcomputer based sys­
tem should prove very attractive to utilities.
Obviously, much more work remains to prove the system and bring 
it to practical application and utility acceptance. Considerable work
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should be done to develop new digital protection techniques rather 
than relying on digital adaptions of classical methods. Work on modi­
fying digital equipment for error-free operation in the hostile substa­
tion environment should be pursued. This should Include work In 
optical waveguide communications between remote terminal units and the 
substation processors. Considerable attention should be given to 
special changes in microcomputer architecture to fit the special needs 
of the proposed system. Reliability data on electromechanical, static, 
and computer relay systems Is either non-existent or unavailable, therefore, 
expansion of this data base would be a significant contribution. Final­
ly, a major effort to hardware Implement the proposed system In a sub­
station Is appropriate. Long-term field tests to Improve the control and 
functional definition of the substation and prove system reliability 
and capabilities would be valuable Indeed.
APPENDIX I
MICROCOMPUTER ANALYSIS
A computer system can be broken down Into four basic components:
1. Input/output unit (lOU) for entering data and instructions 
and for obtaining results;
2. Memory unit for storage of programmed instructions, 
results of calculations, data, etc.;
3. Arithmetic and logic unit (ALU) for performing operations 
on data;
4. Control unit for instruction interpretation, instruction 





The physical construction and hardware configuration of each of 
these units varies considerably between computer types. For "microcompu­
ters" as defined herein, large scale integration construction and solid- 
state memory devices are assumed. [59-61] A microcomputer, as the term is 
used here, is always built around a microprocessor chip(s). The micro­
processor, or CPU, is connected by data buses to the control program stored
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in memory, the memory locations for storing data and results, and all 
input/output devices. A block diagram showing this configuration, 













Central Processing Unit (CPU)
The heart of a microcomputer is its central processing unit (CPU) 
usually referred to as a microprocessor. This unit can be of single or 
multiple-chip construction. For example, the INTEL 8080 device uses a 
single, 40 pin chip, whereas the National IMP-8 is of multiple-chip design.
[62] The pin configuration for another single chip microprocessor, the 
Mostek 5065, is shown in the following figure. [63]
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Vss — 1 40 —  FLAG
HO — 2 39 —  NC
HI — 3 38 —  Vdd
H2 — 4 37 —  DATA-STROBE
H3 — 5 36 —  LO
H4 — 6 35 —  LI
H5 — 7 34 —  L2
H6 — 8 33 —  L3
H7 — 9 32 —  L4
Vgg — 10 31 —  L5
Write~ 11 MK 5065 30 L6
PESY — 12 29 —  L7
DMA — 13 28 —  Clock
MAC — 14 27 —  State Strobe
WAIT — 15 26 —  NC
BUSY — 16 25 —  NC
NC — 17 24 —  NC
STEP — 18 23 —  RESET
LEV 2__ 19 22 __ IMT 2
LEV 1__ 20 21 _  IMT 1
NC = No Connection Figure 23
The function of the CPU is to interpret and implement the 
instructions stored in the control memory. As subsystems, it must include 
an arithmetic and logic unit (ALU), registers, I/O control logic, timing 
circuits, etc. A simplified block diagram showing the interconnection of 




























Memory is typically classified as either random access memory 
(RAM) or read only memory (ROM). This memory is generally defined by 
the following data: 1) word length in binary bits; 2) the number of
words which can be stored in memory (word size is in powers of 2— e.g.
2^^ = 1024 = Ik words); 3) speed, indicating the time to read (write) a 
word from memory.
The control program is typically stored in read only memory 
(ROM). It would be possible to store the control program in RAM, but it 
should be noted that RAM memory is usually volatile and therefore reload­
ing of the program would be necessary after each power-down condition.
Since ROM memory is usually of a permanent nature, it is used for this 
function. Since seldom are the memory locations for data storage needed 
on a permanent basis, random access memory (RAM) is used for this function. 
Since the read-write time to RAM memory is independent of memory location, 
RAM is ideally suited for data storage. Programmable and erasable ROM's 
are available which facilitate the programming function. Several manu­
facturers have also announced non-volatile RAM's which would allow memory 
to maintain during brief periods in a power-down condition. An example of 
a 1024 X 8 bit, static ROM is the MCM 6830 produced by Motorola. [64] It 
is constructed in a 24 pin ceramic package. Pin assignment and an explana­




1 c Gnd AO =J 24
2 C DO A1 =J 23
3 E D1 A2 3  22
4 C D2 A3 □  21
5 C D3 A4 □  20
6 C D4 AS □  19
MGM
7 C D5 6830 A6 □  18
8 C D6 A7 □  17
9 C D7 A8 □  16
10 p CSO A9 □  15
11 C CSl GS3 □  14




























A microcomputer is a combination of the CPU and various memories 
with buffers, latches, clock, and I/O devices to produce a functional 
computer. A block diagram of a simple microcomputer built around an INTEL 




















The features and characteristics of microprocessors vary consider­
ably between manufacturers. For Illustrative purposes selected Information 
on the Mostek 5065 processor Is herein presented.[66] Mostek lists these 
features for Its microprocessors.
1. 8 bit parallel microprocessor on a single chip
2. 51 basic lnstructlons/81 Instructions with modifications
3. TTL compatible Input and output
4. Directly addresses 32k x 8 bit memory
5. Triple level architecture for rapid Interrupt servicing
6. Single 40 pin package
7. Direct memory access capability
8. Requires standard power supply voltages
9. Indirect addressing capability
Instructions for the MK 5065 can be divided Into approximately 








8. Status change Instructions
9. Accumulator/link Instructions 
10. Input/output Instructions
An Instruction set table which classifies all Instructions and 
gives a mnemonic and description of each Is presented below.
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TABLE 6 - INSTRUCTION SET 
ACCUMULATOR INSTRUCTIONS
Mnemonic Description
STM Store accumulator contents into memory
LDM Load memory contents into accumulator
ANM "AND" memory contents with accumulator
EDM Exclusive OR memory contents with
accumulator
ADM Add memory contents to accumulator
SBM Subtract memory contents from
accumulator
CAM Compare memory contents with accumulator
and skip if not equal
LDP Load contents of pointer register into
accumulator
IMMEDIATE INSTRUCTIONS
LDI Load immediate data into accumulator
ANI "AND" immediate data with accumulator
EOI Exclusive OR immediate data with
accumulator
ADI Add immediate data to accumulator
SBI Subtract immediate data from accumulator
CAI Compare immediate data with accumulator
and skip if not equal
MEMORY INSTRUCTIONS
INM Increment contents of specified memory
location by one.
DCM Decrement contents of specified memory
location by one




JPM Unconditional jump to memory address
specified by the Instruction.
JPI Unconditional jump to immediate memory
address specified by the Instruction
JDZ Jump direct to the address on page
zero that Is specified by the contents 
of the accumulator
JDC Jump direct to the address on the
current page that Is specified by the 
contents of the accumulator
JIZ Jump Indirect to the address on page
zero that Is specified by the contents 
of the accumulator
JIG Jump Indirect to the address on the
current page that Is specified by the 
contents of the accumulator
GSM Gall subroutine at memory location
specified by Instruction
GSI Gall subroutine at memory location
specified by Instruction
LGM Shift the operating level down and call
the subroutine at the memory location 
specified by the Instructions
RET Return from subroutine
SHIFT INSTRUGTION
RRS Rotate contents of accumulator right
RRL Rotate contents of accumulator and
main link right
RLS Rotate contents of accumulator left
RLL Rotate contents of accumulator and main
link left
EXGHANGE INSTRUGTION





XAP Exchange contents of accumulator and 
pointer
XAH Exchange contents of accumulator halves 
SKIP INSTRUCTIONS
SAZ Skip the next instruction if the 
contents of the accumulator is all 
logical zeros
SNZ Skip the next instruction if the contents 
of the accumulator is not all logical 
zeros
SAP Skip the next instruction if the 
contents of the accumulator is positive
SAN Skip the next instruction if the 
contents of the accumulator is nega­
tive
SLZ Skip the next instruction if the 
contents of the main link is a logical 
zero
SLO Skip the next instruction if the 






HLT Stop instruction execution
LUP Shift operating level up
LDN Shift operating level down 
INPUT/OUTPUT INSTRUCTIONS
lAL Input LBUS data to accumulator
IAS Input LBUS to accumulator. Skip the next 
instruction if the contents of the main 




OAH Output accumulator contents on HBUS
GAS Output accumulator contents. Skip
the next instruction if the contents 
of the main link is a logical one.
ACCUMULATOR/LINK INSTRUCTIONS
MAL Modify accumulator, link
APPENDIX II
TYPICAL MICROPROCESSOR APPLICATIONS
(Present or Near Future
1. Desk Top Computers 14. Automobile Diagnostics
2. Check Processors 15. General Machine Diagnostics
3. Payroll Systems 16. Data Communications Processing
4. Automatic Inventory Systems 17. Optical Character Recognition
5. Electronic Scales 18. I/o Terminals for Computers
6. Process Controllers 19. Electronic Office Files
7. Chemical Analyzers 20. Security Monitoring Devices
8. Urban Traffic Control 21. Environmental Control and Monitoring
9. Automatic Type-setting 22. Computer-controlled Artificial 
Organs
10. Point-of-sale Terminals 23. Collision Avoidance Systems
11. Compact Business Machines 24. Automobile Ignition/Control Systems
12. Medical Instrumentation 25. Graphics Controllers
13. Medical Diagnosis 26. Industrial Equipment Controllers
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